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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis studied China’s energy security policies’ primary drivers and, more 
specifically, how China acquires the energy needed to satisfy its social and economic 
needs. This thesis examined three primary drivers of China’s energy security policies: the 
diversification of resources due to foreign pressures, the development of green energy, 
and the increase in growth and urbanization. After systematic analysis, this thesis found 
that China has not achieved energy independence because of an increase in growth and 
urbanization and heavily relies on imports to meet demands. China primarily relies on 
coal to fulfill its demand and lacks the domestic capability to meet its oil and natural gas 
demands. Air pollution and climate change are the primary motivators for China’s green 
energy policies, prompting China to develop modern technology in the renewable energy 
sector to reduce air pollution, making it the global leader in the sector. China diversifies 
its energy security portfolio to avoid geostrategic risks to the energy mix, such as the 
Malacca dilemma and uncertainty with the Strait of Hormuz. China is dependent on 
Australia for natural gas and on the Middle East for oil imports. China seeks to secure 
access to resources via pipelines from Central Asia and Russia to avoid security issues in 
the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is driving its 
energy security policies to meet energy security demands. Outlining how China defines its 
energy security policies could give an understanding of how China drives its national 
security, foreign policy, and domestic resource development. China recognizes that energy 
security is a long-term strategy toward continuous economic development and urbanization 
while calculating and preventing risks to the environment. As the number one energy 
consumer and the number one emitter of greenhouse gases, China continues to rely 
primarily on domestic coal and oil and natural gas imports from the Middle East. The 
World Energy Council ranks China 72nd with a trilemma score of 63.7 out of 100 (see 
Figure 1).1 China’s low score emerges from its dependence on imports, lack of energy 
storage, and carbon dioxide emissions per capita. Many of the concerns are recognized by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the furtherance of long-term energy security 
strategies. Noted by the graphic, China is dominant in the energy equity quadrant of the 
energy trilemma, meaning reliable access and affordability of energy.2  
 
1 “WEC Trilemma: Country Profile,” World Energy Council, accessed April 13, 2020, 
https://trilemma.worldenergy.org/#!/country-profile?country=China&year=2020. 




Figure 1. China’s Energy Trilemma Score3 
The majority of scholars and analysts argue that China’s energy security policies 
orient toward diversifying its energy security portfolio.4 Diversifying its energy mix is 
significant for China in order to reduce dependence on foreign imports, fulfill the void in 
domestic supplies, and to lessen the fear of foreign dependence. Furthermore, China drives 
its policy toward energy efficiency and environmentally friendly policies. As the largest 
producer of greenhouse gases and the number one consumer of coal, scholars argue that 
China recognizes the long-term environmental impacts and the necessity to reduce coal use 
and replace it with clean energy.5  
This thesis investigates the major drivers of China’s energy security and studies, 
advances, and interconnects existing scholarship with new scholarship. This research 
assesses and describes the energy dilemma that China confronts between economic and 
energy development, energy efficiency, and environmental pollution. Furthermore, this 
 
3 Source: World Energy Council, “WEC Trilemma: Country Profile.” 
4 Erica Strecker Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), 18. 
5 Bing Wang et al., “Role of Renewable Energy in China’s Energy Security and Climate Change 
Mitigation: An Index Decomposition Analysis,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 90 (July 1, 
2018): 189, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.03.012. 
3 
thesis addresses contradictions between the drivers and how the contradiction between the 
different drivers might lead to difficulties in achieving any of these objectives.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
Researching the driving factors on how China structures its energy security policies 
is essential for two different reasons. China’s increase in energy demand affects the global 
energy supply, demand, and prices, which is fueled by the industry sector and the increase 
in urbanization. Additionally, how China drives its energy security policies will determine 
how its national security policies are oriented, which will, in turn, affect U.S. foreign 
policy, such as U.S. sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, operations in the South China Sea, 
and the Paris Climate Agreement (PCA).  
1. China’s Increased Energy Demand and Economic Rise  
China’s economic power is on the rise and will continue to be an influence on the 
global stage. China’s economy began its rise in 1979 when it transitioned from an agrarian 
command economy to a modernized industrial semi-market economy. Since opening up its 
economy, China has developed into one of the world’s most powerful economies. From 
2000–2018, China’s GDP, on average increased 9% and has risen over 800 million people 
from poverty.6 The World Bank estimates that China’s economic growth will average 3.5% 
on the low end and 6% on the high end to 2030.7 China is the world’s largest exporter of 
that consists of labor-intensive products and is the largest economy in the world in terms 
of gross GDP purchasing power parity.8  
 
6 Wayne M Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the 
United States,” June 25, 2019, 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf. 
7 P.R. China World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, China 2030: 
Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2013), 369, 
https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-9545-5. 
8 “World Economic Outlook (October 2019) - GDP, Current Prices,” International Monetary Fund, 
October 2019, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPGDP@WEO. 
4 
China was once a net exporter of energy; however, since 1993, China has been a 
net importer of oil and continues to be the number one importer of oil.9 As China’s 
economy continues to develop and grow, so will the demand for energy and resources to 
fuel the economy. Since 2000, China’s energy utilization has more than doubled.10 The 
significant spike in China’s energy demand directly correlates to its economic development 
in the industry sector and urbanization of rural areas. From 2000–2017, China’s industry 
sector tripled its energy use, while the transport sector more than doubled its use.11 China 
fueled this rise with an increase in net energy imports. Oil imports more than doubled, and 
China began importing natural gas in 2006.12 Imports in 2006 were 36,984 terajoules (TJ) 
and increased to 3,454,731 TJ.13  
A study of China’s most recent state-led plans indicates how it assesses current and 
future energy security policies. In March 2016, China’s National People’s Congress ratified 
and published its 13th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the 
People’s Republic of China that outlines its progressive goals toward energy security and 
development.14 Outlined within China’s plan is to “build a modern energy system that is 
clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient, and will safeguard the country’s energy security.”15 
China places a premise on developing hydropower plants in basin areas while recognizing 
the importance of protecting the ecological environment.16 China also emphasizes thermal 
and solar development in the 13th Five-Year Plan. Additionally, the plan highlights 
constructing nuclear power plants along China’s coast and implementing the appropriate 
 
9 Jeff Barron, “China Surpassed the United States as the World’s Largest Crude Oil Importer in 2017 - 
Today in Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),” February 5, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34812. 
10 “Asia Pacific – Countries & Regions - Energy Consumption by Sector,” International Energy 
Agency, October 29, 2019, https://www.iea.org/regions/asia-pacific. 
11 International Energy Agency. 
12 International Energy Agency. 
13 International Energy Agency. 
14 “The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020),” National People’s Congress, 2015, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/
newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf. 
15 National People’s Congress, 84. 
16 National People’s Congress, 84. 
5 
safety measures to avoid crises such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant. China 
plans to limit the development of coal in the eastern and central parts of the country while 
modernizing and innovating coal development and production in the west.17 In the oil and 
natural gas sector, China explains that it will improve both onshore and offshore 
exploration, development, and procurement of oil, natural gas, and shale products while 
alleviating mining rights to increase public and private sector involvement.18  
In addition to specific energy sector advancements, China’s Five-Year Plan 
outlines an increase in compliance with pollution control. Specific compliance includes 
modernizing the industry sectors that do not maintain emissions criteria, increase the use 
of natural gas in major metropolitan areas by 45 billion cubic meters, which decreases coal 
use by 189,000 tons, and ceases developments that abuse state industrial regulations.19 All 
of these plans are to reduce heavy air pollution days by 25% through increased monitoring 
and enforcing compliance.20 China also outlines to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 and by 
2020 decrease CO2 per unit of GDP by 18%.21   
Infrastructure projects in the energy field, as part of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), are integral to China’s energy portfolio. To date, 46% of projects are 
dedicated to energy, and 25% are transportation and shipping.22 In 2013, Xi Jinping 
announced that plans were in place to revive the old Silk Road. The BRIs are proposed to 
improve infrastructure in developing countries to increase economic and geopolitical 
relations. The Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road 
Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road highlights several key factors that 
illustrate how deep BRI is connected with energy security: 
 
17 National People’s Congress, 84. 
18 National People’s Congress, 84–85. 
19 National People’s Congress, 130–31. 
20 National People’s Congress, 128. 
21 National People’s Congress, 19. 
22 World Bank, “Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors” 
(Washington, D.C: The World Bank, March 18, 2019), 38. 
6 
• The Belt and Road Initiative seeks to foster energy cooperation in order 
to jointly build up an open, inclusive, and beneficial community of 
shared interests, responsibility and destiny; 
• The cooperation will be green and efficient. We will attach great 
importance to the issue of environmental protection in the process of 
energy development, and strive to encourage the efficient development 
and utilization of clean energy. We will strictly control the emission of 
pollutants and green-house gases, raise energy efficiency and contribute 
to green and efficient development in all countries; 
• The cooperation will be safe and secure. We will strengthen 
communication, increase mutual trust with relevant countries, and 
reduce risks in the energy supply mechanism. We will jointly secure 
international energy production and transmission pathways and build up 
a safe and efficient energy security system.23 
Projects for building pipelines in Kazakhstan were part of the first projects for importing 
natural gas. Thereafter, ports in Sri Lanka were built to support commercial shipping and 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy. China also manages and finances projects that 
developing countries cannot afford to support joint goals. Energy is deeply connected with 
BRI projects. BRI projects extend through Asia and as far as Europe and Africa (see Figure 
2).24 China’s energy security strategy is projected to change as part of BRI. Energy security 
approaches are supposed to shift from quantitative to qualitative.25 Instead of focusing on 
the number of imports, China’s focus is proposed to be on building new and improving 
existing infrastructure. However, this objective has not yet been fully realized.26  
 
23 “Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road,” National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC), March 18, 2015, 
https://www.followingthemoney.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017_NDRC-NEA_Vision-and-Actions-
on-Energy-Cooperation-in-BRI_E.pdf. 
24 “Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: This Is Where We Stand,” Mercator Institute for China 
Studies, June 7, 2018, https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/mapping-the-belt-and-road-initiative. 
25 Erica Strecker Downs, Asia’s Energy Security and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, NBR Special 
Report ; #68 (Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 2017), 32. 
26 Vaclav Smil, “A Critical Look at Claims for Green Technologies - IEEE Spectrum,” IEEE 




Figure 2. BRI Current and Proposed Projects27 
2. Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy 
Chinese energy security also has a major impact on U.S. foreign policy in Asia. The 
Malacca Strait, according to Ole Odgaard and Jorgen Delman, is a strategic chokepoint 
that accounts for approximately 80% of China’s imports.28 The point of contention for 
China is the continuous presence and routine patrols of the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, the 
United States supports multilateral agreements by forward deploying U.S. Navy ships to 
the region to conduct operations to assure freedom of passage and navigation through the 
Malacca Strait. The dilemma is that Chinese maritime shipping travels freely through the 
Malacca Strait under the security of the U.S. Navy; however, if a conflict arose between 
the United States and China, the Malacca Strait would be controlled by the U.S. Navy and 
 
27 Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, “Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: This Is Where 
We Stand.” 
28 Ole Odgaard and Jørgen Delman, “China’s Energy Security and Its Challenges towards 2035,” 
Energy Policy 71 (August 1, 2014): 113, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.03.040. 
8 
would cut off China’s maritime trade.29 Although China continues to rely on the strategic 
chokepoint for maritime trade, the Malacca dilemma has caused China to diversify its 
energy security strategy overland via pipelines in Asia and the Middle East to solidify its 
risk mitigation plan if it were to go to war with the United States.  
Another point of contention is that China imports energy resources from U.S. 
sanctioned countries. Through the BRI, China has loaned Venezuela $60 billion to support 
infrastructure projects; however, Venezuela has been unable to make its payment, and in 
lieu of repaying its debt to China, Venezuela exports 10,000 barrels of oil per day.30 
China’s financial interest opposes U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela. The United States has 
intervened and targeted Russian and Cuban oil companies, in addition to interdicting 
vessels, supporting the Maduro regime.31 In August 2019, China temporarily suspended 
oil imports in support of U.S. sanctions against Venezuela.32 Although it remains unclear 
when China will lift its suspension, China’s financial interest in Venezuela remains an 
enduring controversy for U.S. foreign policy.  
China and the United States are also in the same predicament over Iran; however, 
the difference is that China continues to import Iranian oil. China’s energy security strategy 
complicates relations and increases tension between the United States. In 2016, China and 
other countries in Asia increased energy imports after the United States lifted sanctions on 
Iran.33 Since then, the United States renounced its participation in the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran and reinstated sanctions on Iran.34 The 
 
29 Odgaard and Delman, 113. 
30 “China Spurns Venezuelan Exports,” Petroleum Economist, 2019, https://www.petroleum-
economist.com/articles/politics-economics/south-central-america/2019/china-spurns-venezuelan-exports. 
31 “Treasury Further Targets Entities and Vessels Moving Venezuelan Oil to Cuba,” U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, September 14, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm784. 
32 Chen Aizu and Marianna Parraga, “China CNPC Suspends Venezuelan Oil Loading, Worried about 
U.S. Sanctions: Sources,” Reuters, August 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-venezuela-
oil-cnpc-idUSKCN1V909C. 
33 Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs and Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Expanding Economic Relations with 
Asia,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East; Hauppauge 10, no. 2 (2019): 149. 
34 White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Reimposing Sanctions Lifted Under the Horrible Iran 
Deal,” The White House, August 6, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trump-reimposing-sanctions-lifted-horrible-iran-deal/. 
9 
United States has targeted and sanctioned several Chinese oil companies in violation of 
U.S. sanctions, and the U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stated that currently, “the 
China state companies are not buying oil from Iran.”35 Nevertheless, despite China and the 
United States cooperating, illicit Chinese oil imports from Iran continue to be a security 
issue that complicates relations.  
The South China Sea is approximately 1.4 million square nautical miles and is one 
of the busiest waterways, carrying one-third of the world’s trade per year, and is made up 
of natural and manmade islands, reefs, banks, and shoals.36 Due to the rich oil and 
hydrocarbon gas deposits that remain below the earth’s surface, the South China Sea is 
highly disputed between China and five other countries. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration “estimates the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels 
of oil…and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.”37 The 
majority of the disputed area is near the Spratly Islands, with all countries claiming all of 
the area. Over the past decade, China has militarized the Spratly Islands by placing air and 
surface missiles, runways, and infrastructure for military supplies and personnel. The 
increase of military equipment gives China an advantage to forward deploy units to 
maintain a continuous presence, ultimately decreasing response times to threats to its self-
proclaimed territorial claims.  
South China Sea issues are relevant and important to the U.S. National Security 
policy. The U.S. National Security Strategy states, “China’s infrastructure investments and 
trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize 
outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty 
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of other nations, and undermine regional stability.”38 The reclamation and militarization 
of the Spratly Islands have sparked historical territorial disputes between China and other 
claimant states. The U.S. National Defense Strategy also states, “China is a strategic 
competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing 
features in the South China Sea.”39 Washington considers the South China Sea a potential 
area for future conflict if tensions rise between claimant states. The U.S. Navy conducts 
routine freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea in efforts to deter Chinese 
aggression in the area. There will continue to be discord over the South China Sea between 
China and the United States.  
The United States’ intent to withdrawal from the PCA also leaves an empty great 
power seat for China to fill, which could have political implications in the future. In a new 
era of great power competition, China seeks to overtake the United States in world affairs. 
On June 1, 2017, President Trump publicized intentions that the United States will depart 
the PCA and to renegotiate terms or a “new transaction on terms that are fair to the United 
States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its taxpayers.”40 Trump goes on in his 
statement to defy China’s unfair part of the Paris Climate Accord: “China will be allowed 
to build hundreds of additional coal plants…China will be able to increase these emissions 
by a staggering number of years—13.”41 While the United States’ withdrawal from the 
PCA does not mean that it has completely abandoned its support for advancing clean 
energy, it has left room for China to lead the world in green energy for the future. As the 
leader in green energy, and with the departure of the United States from the PCA, a 
significant leadership position opens for China to exert influence within PCA and the future 
of green energy.  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Diversification of Resources  
A survey of scholarship explains that one of China’s goals is to diversify its energy 
resources. The necessity for diversification stems from a lack of domestic resources, a reliance 
on imports, and a fear of foreign dependence. China mainly relies on coal for the majority of 
its energy consumption. However, in attempts to replace coal with natural gas and oil, China 
does not have the domestic capacity to do so. China imports more hydrocarbons than any 
other country in the world and will likely continue to be reliant on imports.  
At present, China’s domestic energy production consists of nuclear, renewables, and 
hydrocarbons, which include oil, natural gas, and coal. China primarily uses hydrocarbons 
and hydropower to meet the majority of its domestic energy supply. The “China Energy 
Efficiency Report” states that, out of China’s energy sources, coal makes up 69.7% of 
domestic energy production.42 Nuclear and renewables production is 17.3%, while oil and 
natural gas is 13%. While China is the world’s largest producer of energy, it relies on 
importing 20% of its total energy consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas.43 
In 1993, China went from a net exporter to a net importer of oil.44 Although, in 2001, 
China’s imports declined to one million metric ton of oil equivalent (MTOE), its energy 
imports in 2017 reached a record level of 632 MTOE.45 The significant rise in energy imports 
is mostly attributed to a large increase in its economy, the inability of domestic resources to 
meet demands, and the urbanization of rural areas. China’s GDP increased elevenfold from 
2000–2018.46 Analysts forecast China’s GDP will grow by an average of 5% from 2025–
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2030.47 Since a high rate of growth is estimated, China’s energy consumption is expected to 
grow. Analysts also assess that China’s consumption growth is to meet U.S. and European 
consumption growth rates of 6.2%, which is likely due to an increase in the standard of living, 
urbanization, and GDP per capita.48  
Although China is rich in coal, with the third-largest coal reserves in the world, it is 
assessed to reach peak production by 2030.49 Additionally, by 2030, analysts estimate that 
China will be import-dependent on coal. In 2008, Vietnam and Indonesia currently 
encompassed over 78% of China’s coal imports. The majority of China’s coal reserves are 
located in the north. Due to transportation costs, China exports coal from the north to Russia 
and imports coal to its southern coast.50 In attempts to reduce coal in China’s energy mix, it 
is likely that the alternative energy source will not be able to keep pace with China’s economic 
growth and urbanization. Therefore, China will have to rely on coal to meet demands.  
In 2017, China became the global leader in oil imports and relied heavily on oil 
imports to meet demands.51 China’s increase in oil demand is “driven primarily by the 
transportation, petrochemical, and road construction sector as well as expanding foreign 
trade.”52 From 2005–2010, China increased its oil use by 6.5 million barrels per day to 9.5 
million barrels per day.53 Furthermore, in 2011, China imported 51% of its oil imports from 
the Middle East, 24% from Africa, 22% from Russia, Central Asia, and Latin America, and 
3% from the rest of the world. China heavily relies on the Middle East for the majority of its 
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oil imports. The energy dilemma for China is a continuous increase in oil imports. China is 
the world’s largest importer of oil and relies on 69.8% of its crude oil to be imported.54 
According to China Natural Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), it predicts that China’s reliance 
on imports of oil will increase to 80% by 2030.55 
Natural gas ranks third in consumption after oil in ranking energy sources consumed 
in China. Although natural gas only makes up approximately 20% of China’s energy 
consumption, China’s natural gas imports increased in 2018 to 45.3% and are expected to 
reach 50% by 2020.56 Lin and Wang suggest that China’s domestic production of natural gas 
is assessed to peak by 2020, which will cause an increase in imports.57 According to these 
analysts, China’s imports for gas come from two different transportation methods - pipelines 
and liquified natural gas (LNG) from maritime shipping. The pipelines run from Central Asia, 
Russia, and Burma, while China’s imports LNG from the Middle East and Australia to its 
southern coast. In the concluding two months of 2019, China imported more natural gas than 
Japan.58 The increase in China’s natural gas use is likely in line with its goals to use cleaner 
energy. Natural gas remains significant in China’s energy mix, and China will continue to rely 
on natural gas as a possible replacement for coal. 
China’s fear of foreign dependence is not just a contemporary concern. The concerns 
are drawn from historical experiences with the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communist Party 
has always feared to become reliant on foreign supplies to meet domestic energy demands, 
especially resources controlled by the United States.59 From a historical perspective, China’s 
reliance on foreign energy defies the “Maoist doctrine of self-reliance.”60 From the 1950–
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1960s, China depended on the Soviet Union for more than 50% of its energy.61 When the 
Sino-Soviet split occurred, China was left with ongoing joint energy projects and left to import 
its energy from the Soviet Union. China’s unpleasant experience with the Soviet Union likely 
contributes to its fear of foreign dependence on energy and the continued need for 
diversification of resources.  
China is also concerned about political threats to its access to energy resources. On 
land, China is concerned with regional stability, domestic and international, where railroads 
and pipelines are located. In areas near Xinjiang, terrorism and extremism are a risk to 
infrastructure and domestic stability.62 Scholars argue that the Strait of Malacca is a primary 
concern for China as 80% of its oil travels through it.63 The U.S. Navy conducts routine 
patrols and maintains a presence in the area. In November 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao 
commented on the Malacca dilemma, stating “certain powers have all along encroached on 
and tried to control navigation through the [Malacca] Strait.”64 Thereafter, a Chinese 
newspaper released this statement, “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the 
Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China.”65 China 
recognizes that the Strait of Malacca is a strategic vulnerability and fears if the diplomatic 
environment changes, its energy resources would be threatened, and it would have to rely on 
strategic reserves.  
In response to the Malacca dilemma, China has diversified its energy portfolio so that 
if tensions escalated between China and the United States, it would have alternate supply lines 
to fulfill its demand. Some scholars argue that most of China’s Malacca dilemma, 80% of 
China’s oil imports, could be resolved through the BRI China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
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(CPEC).66 CPEC provides two functions for China. One, it provides an alternative to the 
Malacca dilemma, and two, it shortens oil transport from 45 days by sea to 10 days by land.67 
In addition to CPEC, China has energy deals with Russia and Myanmar to diversify its access 
to energy resources. CPEC and other pipelines provide China with an alternative to avoid the 
Malacca dilemma. 
2. Green Energy 
Another driver of China’s energy policy is its strong pursuance of green energy 
policies. In 2010, China set a goal to reduce CO2 per unit of GDP by 45% in 2020.68 One 
challenge for China is rapid urbanization. The average urbanization of rich countries is 78%, 
while China in 2014 was at 52.5%. Compared to other wealthy countries, China has a 
significant amount of space to grow. An increase in urbanization will cause energy 
consumption to increase and will complicate the realization of policies to make China go 
green. China’s economic and environmental policies tend to contradict each other, which 
obscures any sort of progress in accomplishing its goals. 
Urbanization and economic development are drivers for China to place green energy 
and to reduce pollution as a top priority. China’s determination to go green is outlined 
internally by the Strategic Action Plan for Energy Development.69 This plan targets the four 
main sectors of pollution and goals to achieve by 2020: power, industry, building, and 
transport.70 In the power sector, China aims to limit annual energy utilization at 4.8 billion 
tons of standard coal equivalent and oblige coal plants over 600 megawatts (MW) to achieve 
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300 grams of coal equivalent per kilowatt per hour.71 In the industry sector, China plans to 
eliminate excess energy capacity and to remove outdated equipment that cannot be 
modernized. In the building sectors, the number of new green buildings produced will account 
for 50% of new buildings in urban regions. China’s emphasis in the transport sector focuses 
on increasing the development of energy-efficient transport, including metro subways, high-
speed rail, and electric vehicles.72  
Clean and renewable energy, such as nuclear, hydropower, geothermal, solar, 
biofuels, and waste, are significant for improving environmental conditions and reducing coal 
usage. In 2013, clean and renewable energy accounted for 12% of China’s overall energy 
usage.73 Biofuels, geothermal, and solar-powered fueled 68% of the residential sector. 
Hydropower and nuclear plants accounted for 19% of electricity in China. From 2013–2016, 
China increased renewable and clean energy almost twofold from 42.3 to 81.7 MTOE.74 A 
contributing factor to China’s drive for clean energy is not only to replace coal but to reduce 
the amount of greenhouse gases and the number of polluted days to reduce risks to its 
population as urbanization and the economy grows.  
Another challenge is changing the incentives for Chinese officials. Regardless of the 
fact that the Chinese Communist Party sets goals for pollution control and environmental 
policy enforcement, China’s state environmental policies contradict with implementation at 
the local government level.75 Elite level “vested interests, interagency rivalries and an 
overriding focus on high growth rates” contradict environmental state policies.76 At the local 
government level, leaders have faced a dilemma of energy conservation or economic growth. 
Local government officials have chosen economic growth because it is used to evaluate and 
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assess how those local officials are performing for promotion.77 There have been efforts, 
however, to address how performance is measured for local officials. In 2015, the central party 
tied environmental pollution to evaluation reports for local officials.78 Time will be a factor 
to assess how these changes have not only affected promotions but for the environment and 
pollution through China.  
As a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
China has taken an all-inclusive approach to pollution control to establishing institutions, 
enforcing energy efficiency policies, and developing clean energy. China is the world leader 
in renewable energy, holding a 25% stake, and produced 106.7 MTOE in 2017, which was a 
record-setting year.79 In 2014, China was responsible for 30% of global carbon dioxide 
emissions.80 China is faced with a dilemma between economic and social development and 
decreasing greenhouse gases; however, China continues to pursue policies that support both 
goals. 
China is also a significant contributor to the PCA and a world leader in renewables 
and green energy. China produces and consumes 30% more in renewable energy than the 
second-place United States.81 One of China’s goals, as part of the PCA, by 2030, is to create 
800–1000 gigawatts of renewable electricity.82 That amount of electricity is enough to power 
all of the United States. Not only is China devoted to developing new energy but it agreed to 
start closing down some of its obsolete coal furnaces and replace with new and clean coal 
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furnaces that are “lower emissions and higher efficiency.”83 China also set a goal that by 
2030, it expects greenhouse gases to peak and to increase clean and renewables to 20% of its 
energy mix.84 In 2016, out of the world’s top producers in solar, five Chinese companies 
ranked in the top six.85 Furthermore, Chinese companies acquired four of the five largest 
deals in green energy. China’s dedication to PCA and to green energy exemplifies that China 
is the global environmental leader. 
D. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESES  
1. Growth and Urbanization  
The first hypothesis is an increase in growth and urbanization in China. China is the 
largest country by population in the world.86 In 2017 it become the largest importer of oil.87 
Urbanization and an increase in Chinese consumption are expected to increase to the western 
rate of 6.2%, which has been a product of China’s sustained economic from since the 1980s.88 
As rural citizens of China move to cities, they acquire automobiles and increase their standard 
of living, which leads to an increase in consumerism and energy consumption.  
2. Development of Clean Energy 
Another hypothesis of the driver behind China’s energy security is developing 
renewable and clean energy to reduce greenhouse gases and pollution. To reduce pollution, 
China developed goals through the Five-Year Plans to reduce pollution by 45% CO2 per unit 
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of GDP by 2020.89 China’s plan to reduce energy usage by shutting down and replacing high-
carbon pollutant coal plants with low-carbon and highly efficient coal plants or renewables 
will significantly improve energy efficiency and reduce pollution. Additionally, plans to 
develop electric vehicles and green public transportation will also help reduce pollution and 
increase efficiency. While the green energy sector has experienced several technology and 
infrastructure issues, it remains the global leader.  
3. Diversification of Resources due to Foreign Pressures  
The most discernable explanation of what drives Chinese energy security is its 
objective of diversifying resources to reduce risks and threats to foreign sources and to 
develop domestic resources and offshore production. China relies heavily on foreign imports 
to fulfill the lack of domestic resources. On average, China imports 20% of its overall 
resources, and the majority are oil and natural gas.90 U.S. sanctions on Iran and Venezuela 
impacts China’s oil imports and constrains its policies elsewhere for resources. The Central 
Asia pipeline is located in an unstable region that faces threats of terrorism and political 
instability. The Malacca Strait is not only vital to China’s consumer industry but to the 
maritime flow of energy to China. The Malacca dilemma is concerning to China because of 
U.S. influence and control over shipping through the chokepoint and is developing energy 
infrastructure in Pakistan and Kazakhstan and increasing imports from Russia to diversify its 
resource portfolio. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis examines the drivers of Chinese energy security policies and is divided 
into four chapters. Chapter I set up the research question, outlined the significance, gave an 
overview of the existing scholarly literature, and established the hypotheses that will be tested. 
Chapter II focuses on the diversification of resources as a driver to China’s energy security 
policies. It begins with an investigation of China’s energy consumption in the industrial, 
residential, and transportation sectors and what resources are utilized to meet demands. Then, 
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the chapter examines China’s domestic development of resources broken down by each 
energy sector, excluding green energy, since green energy will be discussed in Chapter IV.  
Chapter III analyzed China’s domestic environmental policies. The chapter first 
discusses the underlying effects of hydrocarbons, air pollution, and then discusses how the 
CCP outlines its goals to reduce its impact on climate change. This chapter also discusses the 
goals and efforts that China has made to improve the environment by sector—hydrocarbons, 
wind, solar—and then analyzed the results. Then, each sector is investigated to display current 
consumption and demand and then examine future initiatives and issues. 
Chapter IV examines China’s foreign consumption of hydrocarbons and the 
geopolitical factors that drives China’s mixed energy portfolio. Each energy source is broken 
down by country and reviews statistical data and the drivers that secure resources for China 
abroad, which include energy developments from the BRI.  
Chapter V summarizes the findings of the drivers for China’s energy security policies 
and assesses the prospective explanations. Additionally, this chapter will explain the future 
implications for China’s energy security policies on China’s domestic and foreign policy. 
Lastly, this chapter will conclude with an investigation into the future trends of how China’s 
policies will be developed and executed in the near future.  
To build out Chapters II, III, and IV, I reviewed translated Chinese government 
documents to assess the intent and direction of the government to reduce its reliance on foreign 
imports and the development of domestic resources. Another indicator of reducing foreign 
reliance is to reduce overall energy consumption, and so I examined government documents 
to reveal how China plans to reduce consumption. I also investigated external documents from 
international energy institutions to analyze China’s foreign energy security policies that could 
explain further diversification of resources. Additionally, I evaluated new literature from 
primary and secondary sources for changes in the geopolitical environment that could adjust 
China’s long-term plan for energy security. 
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II. DRIVERS OF DOMESTIC ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
The rapid growth of China has significantly impacted China’s domestic energy 
security policies. This chapter will focus on illustrating the drivers of China’s domestic 
energy security policies. The first four sections will discuss China’s overall energy 
consumption and the top three consumers of energy—industrial, residential, and 
transport—broken down by sector. Then, domestic hydrocarbons—coal, oil, and natural 
gas—production, consumption, and significant issues will be analyzed, followed by 
nuclear energy. While greenhouse gas and climate change issues are essential for China’s 
energy mix because of social issues and environmental pollution, these issues will be 
discussed as a separate driver for China’s energy security policy in the next chapter. 
This study finds the industrial sector represents the largest consumer of energy in 
China. While the service sector has overtaken the industrial sector in the gross domestic 
product (GDP) value-added, the industrial sector will continue to be the top consumer of 
energy. The industry sector drives coal consumption. Due to the increase in population and 
rapid urbanization, natural gas and oil have increased in the residential sector. Additionally, 
urbanization has led to a rise in automobile use in China, which has drastically increased 
oil consumption in the transport sector.  
The main driver for coal consumption in China is the industrial sector. Issues within 
the coal sector are the physical location of coal and the lack of infrastructure for 
transportation. While social problems exist with pollution and climate change, coal still 
dominates China’s energy portfolio. In the past, China experienced transportation 
bottlenecks for coal transportation. The bottlenecks occurred due to the natural distribution 
of coal, and because China did not have the infrastructure to support coal demand, which 
has led to energy blackouts. However, the new Hajoi railway will attempt to alleviate 
bottlenecks so that coal shortages do not occur in the future.  
The main driver for China’s domestic energy for oil in China is urbanization, an 
increase in automobile usage, and population increases. The main problem in the domestic 
oil sector is that consumption has consistently continued to outpace domestic production. 
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Between 2009–2019, consumption has exceeded domestic production. In an attempt to 
increase production, China’s offshore program is actively exploring domestic oil. 
China’s natural gas sector’s main driver is an increase in consumption and social 
issues with climate change and pollution. Natural gas consumption is increasing at a 
quicker rate than production. While China contains the largest shale gas reserve globally, 
it does not have the technological infrastructure to fully exploit that energy source. Nuclear 
energy could be a viable replacement for coal-powered electricity. However, nuclear 
energy powerplant projects in China have decreased over the Chinese population’s concern 
over nuclear safety after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident. 
A. OVERALL CONSUMPTION 
In 2009, China took the role of the number one consumer of energy in the world.91 
Between 2018–2019, China consumed 141.70 exajoules (EJ) of energy, more than any 
other country in the world (see Figure 3).92 Coal was consumed more than any other source 
at 81.67 EJ, followed by oil at 27.91 EJ. Hydroelectricity followed oil at 11.32 EJ. China 
consumed 11.06 EJ of natural gas, 6.63 EJ of renewable energy, and 3.11 EJ of nuclear 
power. Overall consumption increased by 4% from 135.77 EJ.93 Compared to 2010 at 
104.28 EJ, China consumed 35% more energy in 2019, averaging 3.48% year on year 
growth in consumption between 2009–2019.94 The industrial sector consumes the most 
energy in China. 
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Figure 3. 2009-2019 China Energy Consumption in EJ95 
1. Industrial Sector  
China is the world’s largest manufacturer, with a 20% share in global 
manufacturing.96 The industrial sector is composed of mining, factories, and electricity 
production.97 China’s industrial sector accounted for 46.49% of GDP in 2010 and 
decreased to 38.97% in 2019 (see Figure 4).98 The service industry in 2010 was 44.17% 
and increased to 53.9% by 2019.99 The decrease of industrial and growth in the service 
sector is part of China’s transition to a service-based economy; however, industrial sector 
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energy consumption has increased since 2010. Overall, the industrial sector is the leading 
consumer of energy and accounted for 49.5% of China’s energy consumption in 2017.100 
 
Figure 4. China’s GDP by Sector by percentage101 
With the “Made in China 2025” initiatives, China is changing how it views 
manufacturing to increase its value-added to global consumerism. The manufacturing 
sector will change from producing cheap goods such as toys and houseware to advanced 
technology products such as ships, airplanes, and green energy transportation.102 With this 
initiative, China’s goal is to create high-quality brands with which it can compete on the 
international level. The industrial changes will impact the economy and directly affect 
China’s energy mix because advanced products will use more energy. 
The industrial sector is vital to China’s economic prosperity. Economic drivers 
indicate that China will continue to use coal and natural gas produced electricity to fuel the 
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vast majority of the industrial sector. Electricity accounted for 296,566 of the 985,923 kilo 
metric ton of oil equivalent (KTOE) in 2017 and has increased by 45% since 2010. While 
electricity has increased between 2010–2017, coal usage for the industrial sector declined 
11% to 517,617 KTOE (see Figure 5).103 In addition to the decline in coal usage, oil also 
declined by 15% to 50,549 KTOE. In contrast, natural gas increased 62%, filling in the gap 
for coal and natural gas, directly in line with China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP).104 In the 
12th FYP, China planned to double its natural gas usage from 2010–2015. Additionally, 
the Chinese government has targeted the industrial sector as the country’s highest pollutant, 
which is why the shift from coal to natural gas is apparent. While the Chinese government 
has reduced natural gas prices, coal is three times cheaper than natural gas.105 Local 
officials and manufacturers will continue to take the more affordable option, which is why 
the industrial sector will remain fueled by coal for the near future.  
 
Figure 5. Industrial Hydrocarbon Usage in KTOE106 
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2. Residential Sector  
The residential sector is the second-highest consumer of energy in China.107 The 
sector is composed of 1.4 billion people.108 Since 2010, the population growth rate 
declined from 0.56% to 0.39% in 2020. Analysts estimate that China’s population growth 
rate will be negative by 2035 at -0.04%, due to China’s one-child policy initiatives.109 
While population growth is expected to decline, urbanization is expected to increase. In 
2011, the proportion of the urban population was more than the rural population for the 
first time. Since 2011, the urban population has increased, on average, 1.07%.110 In 2018, 
the urbanization rate was 59.58%.111 Urbanization is estimated to increase to 70% by 2035 
and increase consumption and ultimately increase electricity usage and energy 
consumption.112  
In 2017, the residential sector consumed 333,585 KTOE (see Figure 6).113 
Hydrocarbons accounted for 39% of energy usage, while the remaining 61% consisted of 
biofuels, geothermal, solar, and electricity.114 In 2017, 78,001 KTOE of electricity was 
consumed, increasing 77% since 2010. Since 2010, the use of natural gas in the residential 
sector increased by 85%, and the use of oil increased by 88%.115 However, coal decreased 
by 4%. Natural gas is used more because climate change and clean air became a social 
issue for China. Four-fifths of respondents from a 2013 survey in China indicated that the 
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environment should be prioritized over the economy.116 As China is transitioning from an 
industrial-based to a consumption-based economy, the CCP focuses more on such social 
issues to maintain its legitimacy. 
 
Figure 6. Residential Hydrocarbon Usage in KTOE117 
3. Transport Sector 
The transport sector is the third-largest consumer of energy in China.118 
Urbanization and increased consumption led to increased use of fuel for this sector. Since 
2010, the number of automobiles rose from 91 million to 258 million in 2019.119 Owning 
a car in China is not difficult but having the right to drive it is. Residents must obtain the 
right to drive by winning a lottery.120 China is the world leader in electric vehicles, with 
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3.5 million electric cars on the road.121 Oil is the most used source of energy for the 
transport sector. From 2010–2017, oil increased 52% from 182,955 to 278,298 KTOE (see 
Figure 7).122 Natural gas accounted for approximately 10% of the transport sector but 
increased by 85% between 2010–2017. Electricity increased twofold between 2010–2017 
and will increase as more of the transport sector transitions from oil to electricity.  
 
Figure 7. Transport Hydrocarbon Usage in KTOE123 
B. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT—COAL  
Out of all the energy sources used in each sector, coal is the dominant fuel in 
China’s economy. China is a coal-dependent country that consumes, produces, and imports 
more coal than any country in the world. China has the fourth-largest coal reserves in the 
world, with 13.2% of the world’s share.124 Coal is the primary energy source in China and 
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reached peak consumption in 2013.125 In 2019, China consumed 81.67 EJ of coal and only 
produced 79.82 EJ. If the same consumption rate is applied to China’s reserves, China 
would have 37 years of coal use remaining in its proven reserves.126 As of 2019, China 
has 2,997 coal power plants with the capacity to produce 1,145 gigawatts (GW) of energy; 
however, only 997 GW are currently operational.127 Coal produced 64% of electricity in 
2019, decreasing from 66% in 2018.128  
China’s domestic coal source location and transportation bottlenecks are drivers for 
China’s coal imports. China’s coal consumers are not located near domestic deposits. 
China’s proven reserves are located in 27 provinces.129 However, 75% of its reserves are 
located in the north and northwestern provinces of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and 
Shaanxi (see Figure 8).130 The location of resources and consumers is a problem for China. 
The majority of China’s GDP growth comes from China’s southeastern region and along 
the coast, where most industries and the population reside.131 Therefore, coal must be 
transported from coal-rich provinces to provide for consumer demand. The output of coal 
has strained transportation infrastructure, and due to bottlenecks in transportation, 
blackouts and energy shortages have occurred.132 While China has an abundance of coal, 
in 2019, China imported 8% of its consumption to avoid bottlenecks and energy 
shortages.133 
 
125 British Petroleum Company, 47. 
126 British Petroleum Company, 44. 
127 “Open-Source Mapping Of China’s Energy Infrastructure,” Baker Institute, July 25, 2020, 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/opensource-mapping-of-chinas-energy-infrastructure/. 
128 British Petroleum Company, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020,” 61. 
129 Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe, “China’s Coal Market: Can Beijing Tame ‘King Coal’?” (Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, December 2014), 50, https://doi.org/10.26889/
9781784670177. 
130 Cornot-Gandolphe, 52. 
131 “China’s GDP Growth - More Shocks Ahead,” China Briefing News, October 26, 2015, 
https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-gdp-growth-more-shocks-ahead/. 
132 Cornot-Gandolphe, “China’s Coal Market,” 66. 
133 British Petroleum Company, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020,” 49. 
30 
 
Figure 8. Map of China’s Coal Reserves134 
Improvements to transportation infrastructure have alleviated coal shortages in 
central and southeastern China. China uses trains, ships, and trucks to distribute domestic 
coal to its consumers. In 2019, the decade long project Hajoi railway was completed.135 
The new railway will transport 200 million tons from Inner Mongolia to Jiangxi and 
shorten transport times from 20 days down to three days. The railway will reduce 
transportation bottlenecks and allow consumers more flexibility in coal usage. Tian Mao, 
a Beijing analyst at Everbright Sun Hung Kai Co, stated, “Coal will remain a dominant 
source of power in the next ten years, even though it’s being gradually replaced by new 
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energy.”136 While replacing coal with clean energy is a top priority for China, it appears 
that coal will remain a primary source of energy for long-term energy security.  
C. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT—OIL  
Oil is the second most used source of energy in China. Economic reforms by Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1990s opened China to foreign investment, which increased industry 
and energy consumption. Since then, China has been dependent on foreign oil. In 2009, China 
domestically produced 47% of the oil it consumed (see Figure 9).137 Since then, that number 
has decreased to 28% but not solely due to a lack of increased production. Oil production in 
China remained stagnant over the last ten years, but consumption has risen dramatically. Oil 
consumption increased by 67% from 2009–2019, with an average of 5.3% yearly increase. 
The increase in oil consumption is primarily from the transportation and residential sector, 
which can be attributed to a rise in population, urbanization, and automobile usage. 
 
Figure 9. 2009-2019 China Oil Consumption and Production in EJ138  
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Oil for domestic consumption comes partially from domestic sources. China’s oilfields 
are located in the north, northwestern, northeastern, and central China (see Figure 10). At the 
end of 2009, China had 21.6 million thousand barrels of oil in proven reserves, and by 2019, it 
contained 26.2 million thousand barrels.139 If consumption, production, and proven reserves 
remained the same, China would have enough oil to last 18.7 years.140 China uses pipelines 
throughout the country to transport oil from oilfields to storage tanks and refineries to refined 
oil storage tanks. China has 185 pipelines across the country, 98 that transport crude oil and 87 
that transport refined products (see Figure 11).141 Crude oil pipelines can move 23 million 
barrels per day (BPD), while refined pipelines carry 7.7 million BPD.  
 
Figure 10. Location of China’s Oil Basins and Oilfields142 
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Figure 11. China Oil Infrastructure143 
Chinese national oil companies (NOC) dominate the oil and gas industries. Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) control upstream oil activities, while Sinopec maintains refinement and 
allocation of products. Sinopec controls upstream onshore, and CNOOC leads offshore 
operations.144 CNOOC partners in joint venture operations offshore with foreign 
companies to employ technical expertise to explore and extract challenging offshore 
projects; however, CNOOC is the majority shareholder of the contract and became the 
project owner after foreign companies have recouped costs.145 In January 2020, China 
opened onshore projects to international oil companies.146 China adopted the same 
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principles from foreign offshore activities to expand domestic exploration and production. 
While foreign offshore companies were given money for their services, NOCs will be 
required to relinquish land portions to foreign companies for payment for their services.147 
Offshore oil production provided 15% of oil production, while offshore natural gas 
provided 6% of production.148 CNOOC is the primary NOC that is responsible for 
conducting offshore activities. CNOOC actively explores new resources in the Bohai Gulf, 
East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Since 2014, CNOOC has increased its oil 
production by 15% and natural gas by 53% by 2019.149 Successful exploration operations 
in the Lufeng area in the South China Sea are attributed to increased natural gas production. 
While an abundance of oil and natural gas remain in the East and South China Seas, 
territorial disputes remain active. The U.S. Energy Information Administration “estimates 
the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.”150 The East China sea contains 
approximately 200 million barrels of oil and 1–2 trillion TCF of natural gas.151 In the East 
China Sea, active disputes between China and Japan occur, while in the South China Sea, 
Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines dispute islands, resources, and 
territorial features.  
D. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT—NATURAL GAS 
While oil fuels part of China’s economy, natural gas is a cleaner replacement for 
coal. While natural gas only accounted for 7.8% of China’s energy consumption in 2019, 
it remains a priority for the CCP’s diversified energy portfolio. In 2019, China consumed 
11.06 EJ of natural gas, which increased by 240% from 3.25 EJ since 2009 (see Figure 
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12).152 However, China only produced 6.39 EJ of natural gas, but it has increased by 106% 
from 3.09 EJ since 2009. Since 2009, China has doubled its proven reserves, and if both 
consumption and production remained the same, China would have 47.3 years of natural 
gas.153 Much like oil, natural gas consumption is increasing at a faster pace than domestic 
production. As part of a diversified energy plan, the CCP stated in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
to “promote the rapid growth of natural gas output” and “strengthen the exploration and 
development of petroleum and natural gas resources.”154 Natural gas is clean energy 
currently used as a substitute for coal, while sustainable renewable energy is developed.  
 
Figure 12. China’s Natural Gas Production and Consumption in EJ155  
China sits on the most considerable amount of untapped shale gas in the world. The 
2015 EIA China shale publication estimates that China has 1,115 trillion cubic feet of shale 
gas.156 While an abundance of shale is located in China, and the CCP wants to exploit it 
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to realize its clean energy goals, China, however, does not have the technology to extract 
at full capacity. China invested heavily in the shale gas industry in hopes of an abundant 
amount of resources; however, issues such as drilling costs and lack of water have caused 
China to change its target estimates for production.157 Shale gas deposits in China are 
located deeper than deposits found in the United States, making it difficult for current 
hydraulic fracturing equipment to operate effectively.158 While China remains in the 
elementary stages of shale gas production, it will continue to rely on other energy sources 
while advances are made in research and development. Additionally, inviting foreign oil 
and gas companies to China could help extract shale gas to add to China’s energy mix. 
E. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT—NUCLEAR 
China ranks third in the world for nuclear energy use. China produced and 
consumed 3.11 EJ of nuclear energy in 2019.159 Since 2009, China has increased its 
nuclear use by 370% from 0.66 EJ. China has operational 48 nuclear reactors and 11 under 
construction (see Figure 13).160 Nuclear power plants are located along the coastline near 
major populations and high GDP growth areas fuel energy demands that coal cannot. In 
the 13th Five-Year Plan, China’s goal is to generate 58 GWs and 30 GWs under 
construction.161 Additionally, the 13th Five-Year Plan stresses improvement for radiation 
safety, monitoring systems, and preventing radioactive pollution to the population.162  
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Figure 13. Nuclear Facilities in China163 
China is developing next-generation nuclear technology but must consider social 
issues with safety and contamination. Mark Hibbs argues that China is on pace to overtake 
the United States and France in nuclear power generation and technology by 2030 and will 
have over 100 nuclear reactors.164 To be the global leader in nuclear energy, China needs 
to focus on efficient and safe domestic nuclear powerplant operations. The 2011 
Fukushima nuclear disaster impacted the Chinese population’s outlook on nuclear energy. 
The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
surveyed the Chinese community before and after the Fukushima nuclear incident.165 The 
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survey found after the disaster, Chinese support for nuclear energy decreased, and when 
asked if they supported the construction of a nuclear powerplant in their town, the results 
illustrated a 41% increase in opposition.166 Since the Fukushima incident and the Chinese 
public reaction, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) projection for nuclear power by 
2050 was cut in half.167 While China does not have a strong track record for industrial 
safety, the fewer reactors China has, the less likely the CCP can be blamed for a nuclear 
incident.168 
F. CONCLUSION  
Ultimately, while China is the largest consumer of energy globally, the domestic 
drivers for energy are primarily consumption, caused by an increase in urbanization, 
automobile usage, and an increase in population. Domestic production has not been capable 
of keeping pace with consumption due to a lack of infrastructure and technology. 
Additionally, the top three energy consumers—industrial, transport, and residential 
sectors—drive how China engineers its energy portfolio. While coal remains the primary 
energy source for the industrial sector, oil and natural gas are increasing in the residential 
sector because of an increase in both population and urbanization. Oil consumption in the 
transport sector increased by 52% from 2010–2017 because of the significant rise in 
automobile use in China.169  
China is the largest coal producer, consumer, and importer globally, which will 
arguably continue to be the dominant source of energy because coal is the primary source 
of energy in the industrial sector. While social issues and transportation issues have caused 
China to change its stance on coal, it has reduced transportation bottlenecks with the Hajoi 
railway project to reduce coal shortages. China lost its self-sustainment of oil in 1993. 
Since 2009, oil production remained stagnant while consumption increased by 67% 
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because of urbanization, a population increase, and an increase in automobile usage.170 
The drastic increase in natural gas use as a source of energy, combined with stagnant coal 
production, could be an indicator that China is using natural gas as a replacement for coal. 
While China is the number one country for shale gas reserves, it does not have the 
technological infrastructure to exploit the resources. Nuclear energy is a clean source of 
energy, but since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident, safety and social issues have shifted 
the Chinese population’s opinion against nuclear power. While China will continue to be 
the number one consumer of energy globally, the heavy use of hydrocarbons has caused 
massive air pollution, which has contributed to the development of green and renewable 
energy and will be the focus of the next chapter.  
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III. DRIVERS OF CHINA’S GREEN ENERGY POLICIES 
China’s efforts in renewable energy will have enduring impacts on the globe. This 
chapter will begin by briefly investigating the drivers for China’s renewable energy 
policies and then analyze the CCP’s policies for renewable energy and the implementation 
of government policies. This study will then explore China’s renewable energy sector—
hydropower, wind, and solar—by reviewing consumption, production, and underlying 
issues for each energy source. As the leader in renewable energy technology production, 
technological innovation, and investment, its efforts will have an impact on reducing 
domestic pollution and impact the globe through its leadership in the Paris Climate 
Agreement. While the Belt and Road Initiative play a crucial role in the energy sector, this 
study focuses on the internal side of how China acquires its own renewable energy and 
issues that are associated with renewable energy.  
This chapter finds that drivers that influenced China’s pursuit of renewable energy 
are primarily air pollution, created from a long period of sustained economic growth. Air 
pollution has become a domestic concern for Chinese citizens and the CCP because of 
negative health issues and pressure from the international community. The Chinese 
government states that it is committed to decreasing air pollution, and President Xi Jinping 
has claimed that China will achieve “peak CO2 emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon 
neutrality by 2060.”171 China is committed to fighting climate change, which is illustrated 
in its Five-Year Plans. China’s goals with climate change are to “control greenhouse gas 
emissions, increase adaptability to climate change, and to launch wide ranging international 
cooperation.”172  
To outline targets for renewable energy, the CCP has used Five-Year Plans and 
additional government policies. To alleviate confusion, however, the CCP has decided that 
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the government will only use Five-Year Plans to outline future targets. The significant 
themes in government documents are adapting to air pollution and climate change 
throughout China.173 Moreover, international collaboration and assistance represent 
another central theme for CCP’s devotion to renewable energy as it expands its role in the 
international community. Another theme that was brought out was that short term Five-
Year Plans constrain laissez-faire market principles, which impacts the supply and demand 
of China’s renewable energy sector.  
Hydropower, wind, and solar represent the majority of renewable energy in China. 
Hydropower dominates the renewable energy sector almost twofold.174 Wind and solar 
became a prominent component of the renewable energy sector between 2009–2013. 
Energy sources in the renewable energy sector, however, experienced curtailment issues 
because of the lack of interconnectedness of the energy grid, which caused local 
governments to rely on coal. Wind and solar experienced a boom-and-bust market cycle 
because of the inability to manage prices and adjust subsidies within the sector.175 
Domestic renewable energy has increased drastically, and coal plant restrictions have 
eased, likely until the infrastructure is complete for renewable energy. While coal plant 
restrictions have eased, all new coal plants are built using China’s cutting-edge coal 
technology. New coal plants will have a reduced impact on the environment compared to 
older model coal plants.  
A. FACTORS THAT DROVE CHINA TO PURSUE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
This section will briefly review some of the major drivers that influenced the CCP 
to pursue renewable energy, for which air pollution appears to be the primary driver. When 
Deng Xiaoping opened China up to the world in the late 1970s, it experienced sustained 
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economic growth that built the world’s most polluted economy.176 China’s hyper-focused 
efforts on economic growth, using Soviet and western ideals for industrialization such as 
steel, iron, and coal significantly contributed to large scale pollution.177 During the period 
of sustained economic development, local officials prioritized economic growth over 
concerns for the environment because the bureaucrat promotion system incentivized 
economic growth. Coal was the primary energy source during that period because of its 
availability and has remained the dominant energy source to the present day. In addition to 
the industrial sector, an increase of automobiles and Chinese built diesel trucks, which put 
off more nitrogen dioxide than Western models, impact air pollution.178 
As China emitted 27% of the world’s greenhouse gases in 2014, pollution has 
caused health issues to rise throughout China.179 Air pollution causes approximately 1.2 
million premature deaths every year and “respiratory, cardiovascular, and cerebrovascular 
diseases.”180 Additionally, 11% of stomach cancers have been linked to water 
contamination from polluted drinking water. The pollution in China has also affected 
neighboring countries such as Japan and South Korea, who have concerns because of acid 
rain and smog caused by China.181 Health issues and public safety concerns have become 
a high priority for China’s citizens, displayed by a notable increase in environmental 
protests. 
These domestic protests have increased because of the increasing air pollution, 
smog, and health concerns in China. A former member of the Committee of Political and 
Legislative Affairs, Chen Jiping, stated “that environmental issues are a major reason for 
‘mass incidents’ in China—unofficial gatherings of one hundred or more that range from 
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peaceful protest to rioting.”182 The number of environmental mass incidents increased to 
732 in 2013, a 31% increase from 2012.183 Protests have called for the CCP to raise the 
government’s response to pollution. “In March [2014] President Xi Jinping ‘declared war’ 
on pollution. Addressing the opening session of the National People’s Congress, China’s 
largely rubber-stamp parliament, Xi said pollution is ‘nature’s red-light warning against 
the model of inefficient and blind development’.”184 The CCP has responded multiple 
ways with scrutiny on high polluters and emphasizes reducing pollution in the CCP’s Five-
Year Plans, which will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.  
As the number one emitter of greenhouse gases globally, and as China entered onto 
the world stage as a great power, its intense amount of carbon emissions caused the 
international community to exert pressure on China to fight climate change. To strive to be 
seen as a responsible member of the international community, China joined the Paris 
Climate Agreement on September 3, 2016, and committed to:  
• Peak CO2 emissions by 2030, or earlier if possible; 
• Increase the share of non-fossil energy sources in the total primary 
energy supply to around 20% by 2030; 
• Lower the carbon intensity of GDP by 60% to 65% below 2005 levels 
by 2030.185 
On November 12, 2020, President Xi Jinping announced during a video teleconference 
during the third Paris Peace Forum that China will achieve “peak CO2 emissions by 2030 
and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.”186 Fighting climate change is a fundamental 
principle of a great power, and China will use its commitments to exert soft power influence 
on the global stage.  
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B. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S GOALS 
The CCP recognizes the adverse effects of climate change. This section analyzes 
China’s four government documents to illustrate the broad goals, ambitions, and objectives 
for reducing pollution and increasing renewable energy: Twelfth and Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plans, the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan (APPCAP) 2013–2017, and 
the Action Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War 2018–2020.187 China’s Five-Year Plans 
are released every five years, whereas the APPCAP 2013–2017 was released to solely 
combat air pollution. The Action Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War 2018–2020 is a 
continuation of APPCAP 2013–2017; however, it does not introduce any targets that differ 
from the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Five-Year Plans are 
synonymous with their broad goals to combat pollution and climate change. While there 
may be more specificity to decrease the number of heavy pollutant days in the Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan, both plans share three primary policy goals for managing its response to 
climate change:  
• Control Greenhouse gas emissions; 
• Increase adaptability to climate change; 
• Launch wide ranging international cooperation.188  
With the first component, “Control Greenhouse gas emissions,” China seeks to decrease 
overall energy consumption, reducing pollution.189 Additionally, in the Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan, China planned to implement a system to control greenhouse gas emissions from the 
high pollutant sectors: industry and transportation. As expected, the industry and 
transportation sector are the first and second highest consumers of energy. The industry 
sector primarily uses coal, while the transport sector uses mainly oil.  
The second component to battle climate change is to “Increase adaptability to 
climate change.”190 To realize this goal, China plans to increase scientific research and 
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development to improve its understanding of climate change’s adverse effects and improve 
its surveillance systems for climate change and natural disasters. In 2019, according to 
China’s Ministry of Emergency Management, natural disasters contributed to $47.5 billion 
in economic losses caused by earthquakes and typhoons.191 This second component is 
significant to protecting China’s inland areas from earthquakes and coastal regions from 
typhoons while acclimating to new changes in the environment caused by climate change. 
China’s last element in the fight against climate change points to “Launch[ing] wide 
ranging international cooperation.”192 China intends to foster information exchange in the 
international community, enhance technology, and increase its capacity to support 
countries needing its technology.193 By doing so, China’s objective is to increase its 
international community involvement in climate change. Additionally, China grew its 
global involvement, but it is now attempting to create a market for its green energy 
products. Where jobs have declined in the coal industry, China has increased domestic jobs 
in the green energy sector. 
China mandates guidelines in government documents that outline its determination 
to decrease pollution and increasing renewable energy. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
initiatives reduce non-fossil fuel sources by 11.4% and reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
by 17%.194 China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan increased these goals slightly by increasing 
non-fossil fuel sources to 12% of energy consumption and to decrease carbon dioxide 
emissions by 20% per unit of GDP over the five-year phase.195  
Renewable energy construction in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan was more specific in 
the Twelfth Five-Year Plan than in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan. The following goals 
were set for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for renewable energy:  
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• Construct large-sized hydropower stations in key watersheds, such as 
those of the Jinsha, Yalong and Dadu Rivers, and commence the 
construction of hydropower projects with a total installed capacity of 
120 million kW.  
• Construct 6 onshore and 2 coastal and offshore large wind power bases, 
with an additional installed capacity of over 70 million kW.  
• Construct solar energy power stations with a total installed capacity of 
over 5 million kW with focus on Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Yunnan.196 
The following are goals that were set in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan: 
• Begin construction on 60 gigawatts of regular hydropower capacity, 
giving priority to hydropower development in the southwest; 
• Coordinate the development of end-use markets and power transmission 
routes; take ordered steps to optimize the development of wind energy 
and photovoltaic energy in the northern, northeastern, and northwestern 
regions and in coastal areas; 
• Accelerate the development of dispersed wind power and distributed 
photovoltaic power in the central, eastern, and southern regions; 
• Carry out solar thermal energy demonstration projects; 
• Build the national new energy integrated demonstration zone in 
Ningxia, and actively move forward with the development of 
demonstration zones for renewable energy such as those in Qinghai and 
Zhangjiakou.197 
The similarities between the two plans are the continued focus on increasing hydropower 
in regions where possible. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan focused on constructing wind and 
solar in China’s outer periphery. In contrast, the Thirteenth provides initiatives for the 
central, eastern, and southern regions, which are major population centers. 
China’s desire goal to decrease pollution became more specific in the Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan. Specifically, China intended to reduce the number of heavy pollutant days 
by 25%.198 Additionally, as part of the Environmental Governance and Protection 
Initiatives in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, China plans to: 
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• Transform enterprises in the steel, cement, plate glass, papermaking, 
printing and dyeing, nitrogenous fertilizer, and sugar refining industries 
that cannot consistently meet emissions standards; 
• Work to basically eliminate coal-fired steam boilers with a capacity of 
ten tons or lower in all cities at or above the prefectural level across the 
country; 
• Control the aggregate coal consumption of all regions; 
• Promote the use of natural gas in place of coal in major cities; 
• Step up the removal of old or high-emissions vehicles from the roads.199 
China’s motivation to adapt and battle climate change is evident in its Five-Year Plans and 
aligns with a decrease in coal consumption by replacing it with natural gas, eliminating 
industries that cannot abide by environmental regulation, and removing automobiles from 
the road that do not meet emission standards. Since the new focus on climate change and 
pollution in CCP Five-Year Plans, they have issued two environmental action plans that 
further outline details and goals.  
While the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan of 2013 replicated most 
of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan targets, supplemental reforms to combat pollution were 
mandated. The main two goals were to:  
• Reduce PM2.5 in the three target regions of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, 
Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta by 25, 20, 15 percent, 
respectively;  
• Reduce annual PM2.5 in Beijing by 34% from the 2013 level.200 
The Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Pearl River Delta, and Yangtze River Delta are urban 
population centers in China and significant contributors to pollution, which explains why 
China targeted these regions. CCP additionally grasped that local officials were not going 
to enforce environmental targets unless the officials were evaluated based on the 
environment instead of economic growth.201 The initiatives included environmental 
protection in the rubric for the promotion of officials, based on their contributions to both 
environmental assessments and economic development. Furthermore, in those three key 
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areas, the CCP restricted any new construction of coal plants and mandated the reduction 
of emissions in coal plants; or, if not, they would be superseded with natural gas.202 Other 
vital mandates included increasing the obligations to comply with environmental 
restrictions and reporting air quality values to the public accurately.203 Green energy 
reform from the 2013 policy sparked the evolution of China’s green energy policies. Feng 
Hao stated, “After an exhausting five-year sprint, China is settling in for a long and steady 
jog.”204 Guidelines from the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan of 2013 
produced positive results and provided China with a baseline for moving forward to the 
publication of its Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan 2018–2020. 
While China is committed to clean air throughout the country, the latest Action 
Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War 2018–2020 does not introduce any additional goals 
beyond the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan. The director for the Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment Wang Jinnan stated “that setting another target outside of the 13th Five-Year 
Plan framework (which runs 2016 to 2020) would create confusion for local governments. 
Therefore, no new quantitative targets have been set. Instead, the plan reiterates the need 
to meet the goals of the 13th Five-Year Plan.”205 Furthermore, the latest action plan does 
not target specific regions of the country and applies to the entire country. Out of 331 cities, 
231 do not meet government policy and the World Health Organization (WHO) standard 
of PM2.5.206 
The Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago Air Quality Life Index 
produced Figure 14, and it explains that, if China were to reduce pollution to the WHO 
standard, life expectancy would increase in years relative to the specific region.207 In 
Hebei, life expectancy would increase by six or more years. In Beijing, Hubei, and Anhui, 
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life expectancy would increase by three to five years (see Figure 14).208 While urban areas 
have more room for growth, over 75% of China has the opportunity to increase life 
expectancy, which is part of the Chinese government’s goal to provide clean air throughout 
the country. 
 
Figure 14. Gain in Life Expectancy if China Reduced Pollution to WHO 
standard209 
C. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
This next section will review and analyze the efforts that have been realized by 
China’s policies, goals, and ambitions. Renewable energy and hydroelectricity are an 
integral part of China’s energy mix, not only for countering pollution but providing a 
reliable source of electricity. China’s renewable energy is composed of mostly 
hydropower, wind, and solar.210 In 2019, China produced and consumed 732.3 terra-watt 
hours (TWHR) of renewable energy and 1,270 TWHR of hydroelectricity, all of which 
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were used for electricity generation (see Figure 15).211 Additionally, renewables accounted 
for 9.7% out of all electricity generation sources, while hydroelectricity generated 17%. 
Between 2009–2019, renewable energy increased, on average, 31% per year. During the 
latter half of APPCAP 2013, renewables increased by 32% in 2015 and 36% in 2016.212 
While hydropower is the dominant non-fossil fuel in the amount of electricity produced, 
solar and wind have increased more year on year average.  
 
Figure 15. 2009-2019 Change in Renewable Energy213 
1. Hydropower 
Hydropower is the oldest and dominant non-fossil fuel source in China’s energy 
mix. China is the global leader in hydropower generation and is home to the largest 
hydropower plant in the world, the Three Gorges Dam.214 Between 2009–2019, 
hydropower increased by 106% (see Figure 16).215 The International Hydropower 
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Association estimates that by 2022 two mega projects on both the Jinsha and Yalong rivers 
will be complete, which will add 30,700 megawatts of hydropower.216 China Three Gorges 
Corporation is the top company in the world for providing clean energy and has constructed 
124GW in China and 17.7GW abroad.217 
  
Figure 16. 2009-2019 Hydropower Generation218 
While hydropower is less impactful to air pollution, it has significant consequences 
on social issues, such as resettling citizens and the environment. A strong debate amongst 
scholars suggests that while dams prevent flooding, create jobs, and provide a reliable 
source of electricity, the negative environmental and social impacts outweigh the 
positive.219 The Three Gorges Dam project is an example that displays the broader issues 
and trends of dam construction. A study by Mount Holyoke College on China’s Three 
Gorges Dam project revealed that citizens who resided along the Yangtze River were 
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forced to move and resettle.220 Furthermore, while the Chinese provided government 
assistance, some citizens were forced to move to higher-cost areas where they could not 
afford to live. The dam causes adverse environmental impacts both upstream and 
downstream such as earthquakes, mudslides, and erosion and has damaged the natural 
ecosystem, which the population relies on for fishing and sustenance.221 
2. Wind  
Wind power plays a significant role in China’s renewable energy sector. In 2017, 
China surpassed the United States and became the world leader for wind power.222 
Additionally, between 2009–2019, China increased its wind power generation thirteenfold. 
The first wind farm was completed in 2009 near Shanghai, which contained 34 turbines 
providing three megawatts of electricity.223 Since then, wind power has increased to 405 
TWHR in 2019 (see Figure 17).224 A study conducted by Fitch Solutions indicates that 
due to technological innovation in the wind sector, construction costs have decreased, and 
it forecasts that by 2028 China will reach upwards of 700 TWHR.225 
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Figure 17. 2009-2019 Wind Power Generation226 
The location of China’s wind resource availability, however, causes difficulties for 
power distribution. China’s total wind resource potential is approximately three terawatts 
onshore and 500 gigawatts (GW) offshore (see Figures 18 and 19).227 A Sino-Danish study 
estimated that by 2030 China’s wind power would reach 400GW, and by 2050 wind power 
will reach 1,000GW.228 The following are China’s wind construction targets by 2050: 
West Inner Mongolia is 300GW, East Inner Mongolia 90GW, Northeastern China 60GW, 
Hebei 60GW, Gansu 120GW, Xinjiang 100GW, Eastern and Central China 70GW, near 
offshore wing 150GW and far offshore wind 50GW.229 Much like coal, wind energy 
availability is located in rural areas, whereas the demand for energy is mostly located in 
the southeastern region and along the coastline. The location of wind energy availability 
causes difficulties for China to achieve economies of scale for power distribution. Offshore 
wind, however, could partially alleviate some of this concern for China. 
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Figure 18. China’s Onshore Wind Potential230 
 
230 Source: China National Renewable Energy Centre, 4. 
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Figure 19. China’s Offshore Wind Potential231 
3. Solar  
Solar power is the second-largest energy source behind wind within the renewable 
energy sector. Between 2009–2019, solar capacity increased from 27.6 to 223.8 TWHR 
(see Figure 20).232 In 2016, China surpassed the United States as the global leader in solar 
power generation, and in 2019, China’s solar generation was twice the amount of the 
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United States.233 By 2050, China is estimated to replace 860 MTOE with solar power.234 
Solar power, however, experiences the same problems that wind does with power 
distribution and the location of available resources. The Tibet region is capable of 
producing up to 2,000 kilowatts per hour per square meter (kWhm2), whereas the Sichuan 
area is much lower with the ability of 1,000 kWhm2, and some areas around are 
significantly less (see Figure 21).235 Tibet and Sichuan are located in western and center 
inland China, which are far from major population centers. The major population centers 
are located in southeastern China and along the coast. 
While China is the leader in solar energy, it has experienced technical issues that 
need to be resolved. Solar panels have increased throughout China because of goals to 
reduce carbon emissions. However, these solar panels are only capable of producing 
electricity for 20 to 30 years.236 By 2050 China is expected to produce 20 million tons of 
solar panels, and most, if not all, of its current solar panels will need to be replaced.237 The 
issue is with both the waste and operational life of solar panels.238 The Chinese public has 
protested solar companies for improper dumping of solar panel material into rivers, which 
caused damages to the ecosystem and a potential food supply.239 China would be able to 
partially reduce the damages of waste if it could produce solar panels that will have a longer 
operational life. Increasing operational life in its solar panels would also make Chinese 
companies more competitive in the solar panel market. This is one issue that China has 
experienced in renewable energy because of heavy investment in the renewable energy 
sector.  
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Figure 20. 2009-2019 Solar Power Generation240 
 
Figure 21. China Solar Radiation Availability241 
 
240 Adapted from: British Petroleum Company, “Statistical Review of World Energy – All Data, 
1965–2019.” 
241 Source: China National Renewable Energy Centre, “China Wind, Solar, and Bioenergy Roadmap 
2050 Short Version,” 11. 
59 
D. INVESTMENT RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR 
China’s drive to reduce pollution, fight climate change, and reduce the socio-
economical costs, incentivizes investment in the renewable energy sector. China is the 
world leader in renewable energy production, innovation, and investments. Out of all 
renewable energy investments in the world in 2017, 45% are in China.242 Additionally, 
China owns 29% of patents on renewable energy projects on the globe, approximately 11% 
more than the second place United States.243 In 2015, China invested $103 billion into the 
renewable energy sector compared to the United States, who invested $44.1 billion.244 
China’s heavy investment in renewable energy has made it the leader in renewable energy. 
During the midst of the coronavirus-19 pandemic, China’s renewable energy installations 
have only dropped 9.3% for the first half of 2020.245 
The worldwide leaders in hydropower, wind, solar, and battery technology are all 
Chinese companies. Between 2015–2021, these companies are expected to construct 36% 
of the world’s hydropower, 40% of wind, and 36% of solar.246 China’s Three Gorges Dams 
Corporation is a state-owned company that is the world leader in hydropower and is 
involved in projects worldwide.247 Goldwind is the worldwide leader in wind power 
projects, but it is not state-owned. Goldwind is a privately-owned company listed under 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.248 Four of the top six solar power manufacturers reside 
in China with an annual production capacity of approximately 21 gigawatts, and the other 
 
242 Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, A New World: The Geopolitics 
of the Energy Transformation, 2019, 28. 
243 Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, 41. 
244 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, “China’s Global Renewable Energy 
Expansion,” January 2017. 
245 Yuki Yu, “China’s Wind & Solar Market 2020 Half-Year Review,” Renewable Energy World, 
August 10, 2020, https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2020/08/10/chinas-wind-solar-market-2020-
half-year-review/. 
246 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, “China’s Global Renewable Energy 
Expansion,” Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, January 2017, 2, https://ieefa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Chinas-Global-Renewable-Energy-Expansion_January-2017.pdf. 
247 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 11–13. 
248 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 20. 
60 
two are Canadian and South Korean.249 In the battery sector, Chinese company Tianqi is 
the world leader in lithium battery production, and Chinese companies own 90% of rare 
earth mining and 72% of worldwide processing, which are used for manufacturing battery 
and solar components.250 China is poised to lead the world in the renewable energy sector 
because of its comparative advantage and industrial capacity in the renewable energy 
sector.251 Because of China’s rapid industrialization in the renewable energy sector, it has 
experienced infrastructure issues within the renewable energy sector. 
E. INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES WITHIN SOLAR AND WIND 
GENERATION 
The last section reviewed China’s investment in the renewable energy sector. This 
next section will outline some of the issues that China has experienced with its domestic 
solar and wind sectors. Wind and solar have experienced the same issues within both 
sectors. High ambitions of supply have exceeded the demands and the capacity of 
infrastructure. In the Northwest region of China, Xinjiang, and Gansu, the installation of 
solar has greatly exceeded the demand, which has led to curtailment.252 Curtailment is 
defined as “the percentage of electricity from wind or solar that could have been produced 
but which the grid would not accept.”253 Solar project construction in Xinjiang exceeded 
23.93% and in Gansu 16.41% of actual capacity.254 Constructing the adequate 
infrastructure for the energy sector requires long-term planning. Solar power hubs are 
completed within a short time span of approximately two months; however, ultra-high 
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voltage lines take upwards of two years to complete.255 Therefore, planning and 
preparation in Five-Year Plans do not fit well into the energy sector with targets. The long-
term aspect of market principles is more effective in providing efficient construction of 
energy projects.  
Wind and solar power curtailment currently represent the most prominent issue 
within the sector. China has produced more wind power than it was capable of transmitting 
with existing infrastructure.256 Fitch Solutions stated, “After 2016, curtailment was taken 
as a serious challenge by the central government and tackled through a combination of 
transmission optimization [optimization] and regulatory and market reform.”257 Power 
companies in China have created “interprovincial markets” for renewable energy to 
transfer power from high producing provinces to locations where demand exists.258 The 
integrated market alleviates power grid bottlenecks to reduce curtailment while increasing 
the efficiency of wind power usage. 
Curtailment issues partly derive from natural unpredictability in power generation. 
Wind and solar generation rely on predictable weather for the efficient management of 
power stations. For solar, production capacity in the summer is greater than it is in the 
winter, and when it is cloudy, power generation becomes more sporadic,259 and wind 
power is affected by storms and periods with no wind. Thus, the unpredictability of power 
generation and issues with curtailment in the renewable sector could be why China is 
continuing to rely on coal as a dominant source of energy.260 
Five-Year Plans conflict with energy market reforms and impact renewable energy 
because government intervention, short-term targets, constrict the laissez-faire principles 
of supply and demand. The CCP sets targets for renewable energy construction through 
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Five-Year Plans, which are not driven by the market principles. Anders Hove argues, “The 
future of renewable energy deployment in China will be shaped by an ongoing 
contradiction within the power sector between long-term market-oriented reforms on the 
one hand and short-term administrative planning on the other.”261 Moreover, China’s 
socialist market reforms are constricted when the CCP places emphasis on setting short-
term five-year targets for local officials. While the CCP has combined environmental 
policies into Five-Year Plans, other laws and provisions contradict one another. Therefore, 
local officials likely defer back to the Five-Year Plan guidance. Local officials are focused 
on Five-Year Plan targets because they are evaluated on their performance in relation to 
the Five-Year Plan and not on long-term market reform for the overarching energy sector. 
The CCP’s inability to manage renewable energy causes issues of curtailment 
within the sector. While the annual capacity of wind and solar power increased from 2014–
2019 (see Figure 22), Anders Hove argues that “Rapid cost declines in wind and solar PV 
[photovoltaic] had led to cycles of boom and bust in the sector, as policy-makers struggled 
to adjust feed-in tariffs quickly enough to prevent overheating the market.”262 Feed-in 
tariffs are designed to act as subsidies for costs incurred for production and are to decrease 
over time and eventually dissipate. China is ceasing all new feed-in tariffs for projects that 
are approved after January 1, 2021.263 The absence of feed-in tariffs will encourage market 
participation, reduction in prices, and innovation in the sector, all of which will benefit 
China’s energy security, energy independence, and climate change.  
 
261 Hove. 
262 Hove, “Current Direction for Renewable Energy in China.” 
263 Joyce Lee and Feng Zhao, “Global Wind Report 2019” (Brussels, Belgium: Global Wind Energy 




Figure 22. Annual Increase in Wind and Solar Power264 
While China has wished to restrict coal plant construction to reduce pollution, 
renewable energy appears to have not met the capacity that was expected to achieve the 
people’s social and economic demands. Hove states that “policy states that provinces 
should ‘in principle’ prioritize renewable energy, demand side management, and imports 
over new coal, if these sources are insufficient to meet peak load then new coal plants can 
be permitted.”265 The policy has caused a shift from restricting coal plant construction to 
allowing the majority of the country to continue to build coal power plants because 
renewable energy projects cannot meet the demands of the people.266 The CCP still 
permits regions to build coal plants. Even though China has reduced pollution, it still needs 
to build coal power plants in order to meet social and economic demands. In 2016, the 
National Energy Administration began a traffic light system that illustrated which 
provinces were restricted in building new coal plants.267 The 2016 map only listed three 
green provinces, and the remaining were orange or red, restricting the construction of new 
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coal plants. A new map was published in 2020, and only five provinces are listed to restrict 
new coal plant construction (see Figure 23).268 The capacity adequacy index explains 
which provinces are at capacity for energy in red, and those in green are provinces that are 
not, while the project economy index explains if the new coal plants will be profitable.269 
China is allowing its local prefectures to build more coal plants because renewable energy 
projects cannot reach the capacity to fulfill social and economic demands.  
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While China is building more coal plants to meet economic demands, its cutting-
edge coal technology is contributing to a greener and less pollutant country. In 2016, the 
Center for American Progress conducted a study in China and visited several coal power 
plant facilities.271 Their study analyzed the different types of coal plants—ultra-
supercritical, supercritical, subcritical—in China. Ultra-supercritical plants are more 
efficient and produce less carbon dioxide emissions, while subcritical are less efficient and 
more pollutant. Their study indicates that out of China’s top 100 coal plants by capacity, 
92 are ultra-supercritical plants.272 In comparison, the United States has one ultra-
supercritical, 69 supercritical, and 30 subcritical coal plants. Additionally, out of all of 
China’s coal plants, 19 percent are ultra-supercritical, 25% are supercritical, and 56 are 
subcritical, and all new coal plants that are constructed are mostly ultra-critical plants.273 
These energy experts proclaim that “the nation is on track to overdeliver on the emissions 
reduction commitments it put forward under the Paris climate agreement and making coal 
cleaner is an integral part of the process.”274 China is ensuring that its coal industry is part 
of the mission of combatting pollution and climate change. While high pollution coal plants 
still exist, new technology in coal plants will reduce pollution.  
China’s utilization of APPCAP 2013 has been successful in conquering pollution. 
Figure 24 displays the change in pollution from 2013–2016.275 The average decline in 
pollution from 2013–2018 was 39%, while China’s most polluted area, Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei, reduced pollution by 41%.276 Furthermore, the CCP canceled plans to build 103 
new coal power plants, and leaders in Beijing closed the last coal power plant in 2018. 
While APPCAP 2013 only targeted three areas—Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Pearl River Delta, 
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Yangtze River Delta—the message was clear to the other provincial leaders that the CCP 
was valuing environmental protection.  
 
Figure 24. 2013-2016 Change in Pollution277 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter found that the drivers for China’s renewable energy originated from 
an economy that experienced sustained growth, but which outpaced the government’s 
ability to manage air pollution, negatively impacting the health of its citizens and leading 
to environmental protests and general civil society discontent. While the origins are 
important to understand, it is also vital to explore how China is driving its latest renewable 
energy policies. At home, China has used its Five-Year Plan in conjunction with various 
air pollution policies to combat air pollution and climate change but now only uses Five-
Year Plan to layout targets to expand domestic renewable energy. The major focus of 
China’s ambitions is reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, adapting to climate change, 
and increasing its efforts to collaborate with the international community on environmental 
issues.  
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This study then analyzed how China’s policies were transformed into realization. 
The majority of China could experience an increase in life expectancy if pollution is 
decreased to the World Health Organization (WHO) standards of PM2.5. In China, 231 
cities out of 331 are not in compliance with China’s own policies and WHO standards. 
China, however, leads the world in hydropower, wind, and solar-generated electricity. 
While hydropower is the dominant renewable source of energy, it has caused the 
resettlement of citizens and damages to the ecosystem and to the environment. Wind and 
solar have increased at a faster pace than hydropower because of technological advances 
and heavy investment. China’s heavy investment in the renewable energy sector has 
elevated it to the world leader in all industrial sectors of renewable energy.  
The renewable energy sector has also experienced curtailment issues because of the 
lack of interconnectedness between provinces and the inability to manage high costs for 
electricity generated by new technology. China will eliminate feed-in tariffs by 2021, 
which will allow the prices for renewable energy to be competitive with coal. Onshore 
wind and solar high-efficient areas are located in northeast and northwest China, which is 
distanced from major population centers in southeast China and along the coast. The issues 
of the renewable energy sector have caused China to ease new coal plant construction 
restrictions. China’s new coal plants, however, are less pollutant than any other coal plants 
in the world. China’s efforts to reduce pollution have been successful in many areas. From 
2013–2016, the country has reduced pollution on average by 39%, which has reduced most 
areas in China below the WHO standard.278 Because of China’s investment in the 
renewable energy sector, China could experience a significant decrease in pollution and 
increase air quality; however, these efforts will come with issues that stall progress. China’s 
domestic production of hydrocarbon, nuclear, and green energy is not sufficient to meet 
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IV. DRIVERS OF FOREIGN ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
China’s rapid industrialization, and the inability to keep pace with domestic 
infrastructure, technology, and energy production, has transitioned China from a model of 
self-sufficiently to a model that inherently relies on energy imports. This study will analyze 
geographic and geopolitical considerations that could constrain China’s energy imports. 
Additionally, this study will evaluate China’s foreign sources of energy—coal, oil, and 
natural gas—and will expand each sector by primary countries to investigate issues within 
each source to explore the primary drivers of China’s foreign energy security policy.  
This chapter finds that China uses a multipronged approach with multiple sources 
abroad to diversify its imports to ensure energy security. Geopolitical tensions are one 
major driver for China’s energy security. The trade dispute between Australia and China 
has the potential to affect coal and LNG imports. Since Sino-Aussie tensions have 
escalated, an unofficial ban on Australian coal imports has increased coal imports from 
Indonesia. However, tensions have not affected Australian LNG exports to China, which 
is why some analysts argue that China is banning Australian coal to protect its domestic 
coal industry.280 China has the capacity to import less coal because of the capacity of 
domestic production, but China’s domestic natural gas production likely does not have the 
capability to support banning Australian LNG imports. 
China has experienced difficulties importing energy from Iran and Venezuela 
because of U.S. sanctions. While Chinese interest in Iran and Venezuela remains high, 
China has significantly decreased energy imports to avoid retribution from the United 
States. However, in an effort to acquire loan repayments from Venezuela, China has 
imported oil from Venezuela illegally under the auspice of other states. Iran and China are 
progressing toward a deal that would involve not only oil but also diplomatic and military 
relations, but the two countries have yet to establish an official agreement.  
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Another driver of China’s energy security is to ensure secure access to energy if 
vital chokepoints— most notably the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca Strait—controlled by 
the United States were closed. China heavily relies on the Middle East for oil and Qatar for 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). China is reducing its risk to this predicament by expanding 
oil and gas pipelines from neighboring states. The Central-Asia China Gas Pipeline 
(CACGP) and current and proposed Russian oil and gas pipelines are significant for filling 
the oil and natural gas demand if conventional seaborne imports are threatened. While the 
Myanmar pipeline does not have the capacity to fill demands, it gives China direct access 
to an LNG terminal in the Bay of Bengal.  
Market forces and energy availability are other drivers for China’s energy security. 
While South China Sea tensions exist between China, Indonesia, and Malaysia, they do not 
drive energy relations. China invests heavily in Indonesia’s coal sector and imports the 
majority of its coal from Indonesia. Additionally, China has secured agreements to import 
LNG from Malaysia and could soon have an agreement in place with Indonesia. Indonesia 
and Malaysia are closer to China geographically, which reduces transportation costs. China 
could potentially import Mongolian coal if prices were competitive with seaborne coal. All 
Mongolian coal imports are transported over roadways. The Russian-built Tavan Togoi 
railway will reduce coal transport costs. If prices are competitive, Mongolian coal could be 
a future replacement for seaborne coal when the Tavan Togoi railway is completed. Lastly, 
an oversupplied global natural gas market is driving China to shift from long-term to short-
term gas contracts with Australia.  
A. INFLUENCES OF ENERGY SECURITY ABROAD  
China is prepared for short-term issues or conflicts that could disrupt foreign energy 
sources. In 2019, China’s strategic petroleum reserves contained an estimated 80 days of 
imports.281 China’s National Energy Administration director Zhang Jianhua stated, “It is 
not that we depend on one certain country or region. Looking at the current situation, even 
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if Saudi Arabia is attacked, it will not affect China’s crude oil supply.”282 China’s strategic 
reserves would give time to reallocate its energy mix; however, if China were in a long-
term conflict with the United States, the United States Navy would blockade key 
chokepoints surrounding the first island chain. Therefore, China would need to import 
more oil overland through pipelines from Central Asia and Russia to sustain economic 
growth.  
The Malacca dilemma shadows over the future of China’s economic and energy 
security. The Malacca Strait is a strategic chokepoint that is significant for China’s 
maritime trade, specifically China’s oil and natural gas imports. While imports could 
navigate around the Malacca Strait, if closed or blockaded by the U.S. Navy, it would 
prevent or delay 80% of China’s oil and 11% of natural gas imports (see Figure 25), 
significantly impacting China’s energy security mix and China’s economy.283 Maritime 
shipping could utilize alternative routes through the Lombok Strait or Makassar Strait, but 
shipping costs could increase by $84-250 billion per year.284 Not only would imports from 
the Middle East be threatened, but also imports from Africa. China’s imports travel through 
the Malacca Strait under the security umbrella of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy routinely 
conducts naval exercises with Singapore in the Malacca Strait and could rapidly control 
the chokepoint. The Malacca dilemma is part of China’s motivations for diversifying its 
energy mix to reduce its energy security threats.  
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Figure 25. China Energy Import Routes285 
The Strait of Hormuz is another chokepoint that is a high risk to China’s energy 
security. Iran periodically threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz because of oil sanctions 
placed on it by the United States.286 The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Navy) 
conducts routine training exercises for rapidly closing and securing the Strait of Hormuz. 
The exercises consist of rocket launches, mining, and swarm tactics against vessels in the 
strait.287 If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, approximately 48% of oil imports and 
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10% of natural gas imports would be affected.288 It can be argued that China’s energy 
dilemma with the Strait of Hormuz is one reason for the increase of China’s naval presence 
in the Middle East. 
China’s naval presence in the Middle East represents soft power diplomacy for BRI 
and protection for maritime trade from state and non-state actors. The Center for Naval 
Analyses argues that protecting seaborne trade near vital chokepoints is the primary driver 
for increased Chinese naval operations in the Middle East.289 In the early 2000s, China did 
not have a naval presence in the region, but China has modernized its naval capacity to 
support rotating presence operations since then.290 Furthermore, China established a naval 
base in Djibouti as a command and control hub and is planning to open a naval base in 
Pakistan to support naval operations further.291 China’s primary naval mission is its 
counterpiracy task force. Since 2008, China has deployed a three-ship rotating Naval 
Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) to the Gulf of Aden, which conducts escort operations 
for China’s maritime trade, including oil and natural gas imports from Africa and the 
Middle East.292 While China’s NETF operations support China’s soft power mission, its 
naval activities are driven toward defending oil and natural gas maritime trade. 
B. FOREIGN SOURCES—COAL 
China became a net importer of coal in 2009 and needed to tap into the world’s 
supply of coal to fulfill its demands. In 2019, China imported 6.40 EJ of coal, 18% of the 
world’s share of imports.293 Since 2009, China’s coal have imports increased by 95%. Of 
the 6.40 EJ, 34% was imported from Indonesia, 32% was imported from Australia, and 
15% from Mongolia. However, in 2019 China closed the gap between domestic production 
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and consumption to 1.85 EJ or 2.3% of the overall output. The main drivers for coal imports 
are transportation bottlenecks, environmental concerns, and domestic resource depletion, 
such as coking coal, a rare type of coal used in the steel and iron industry.294 China 
produced 455 megatons (MT) and imported 48 MT of coking coal.295 China will continue 
to import coal to diversify its energy mix to further to balance domestic production and 
consumption.  
1. Indonesia—Coal  
Sino-Indonesian relations are bound on energy, specifically coal. In 2019, 
Indonesia was the second-largest coal exporter globally, and China was Indonesia’s 
second-largest importer of coal.296 The global recession of 2008 caused coal producers to 
reduce prices. Therefore, China increased its imports from Indonesia because it is less 
expensive to import coal to its southern coast rather than transporting domestic coal from 
the northern part of China.297 In 2017, China imported 109 million tons of coal, and in 
2019 coal imports increased to 139 million tons.298 As coal consumption increases in 
China, Indonesia will continue to be a vital source of coal imports. The relationship 
between the two countries is based on economics, energy, and trade.  
While territory disputes shadow Sino-Indonesian relations, Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) and coal trade are crucial for state relations. The Nantuna Islands are disputed 
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between Indonesia and China.299 Yet, China invested in three coal powerplants in 
Indonesia, which will provide Indonesia with 3100 megawatts (MW) of energy.300 
Additionally, the first of three went into operation in December 2019 and provided 
1050MW of energy. While Indonesian coal plants are part of BRI and money-driven, these 
investments improve Sino-Indonesian relations. Coal imports from Indonesia are secure to 
continue to feed China’s coal demand.  
2. Australia—Coal 
Australia is the second-largest exporter of coal to China and the largest exporter of 
coal in the world.301 Between 2018–2019, China decreased Australian imports by 3% and 
increased Indonesian imports by 3%.302 While 3% is a small change in imports, in 2019, 
Indonesia overtook Australia as the leading exporter of coal to China. Since 2017, tensions 
between China and Australia have increased because of a trade dispute.303 In 2020, 
because Australia insisted on an inquiry into the root cause of the 2019 coronavirus 
pandemic, China placed tariffs on Australian produce and wine and advised five state 
power companies to shift from purchasing Australian coal to domestic coal.304 Some 
analysts claim that an unofficial ban on coal imports was put into place in 2019 because of 
the trade dispute; however, others argue that the ban was to protect China’s domestic coal 
industry.305 The likelihood of China officially banning all Australian coal imports is 
arguable low because trade dispute tensions have yet to increase to levels where China 
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would forgo losing an important source for coal. However, China can argue that it is 
protecting its domestic coal industry to avoid escalating tensions between Australia.  
The trade dispute between China and Australia could shift China’s imports to be 
more reliant on Indonesia or Mongolia to fulfill coal demands. Coal and other energy 
exports from Australia were slightly affected by China’s minor trade dispute and coal ban 
in 2019. While an official ban has yet to be realized, unofficially banning Australian coal 
imports is easily justifiable to protect the domestic coal industry because of the trade 
dispute. China will likely import coal from other countries such as Indonesia or Mongolia 
or could defer back to a self-sustainability model to rely on domestic coal production while 
a trade dispute exists.  
3. Mongolia—Coal 
In 2018 and 2019, Mongolian coal exports accounted for 16% of China’s coal 
imports. Mongolia is a landlocked country and can only transport coal with trucks. 
Mongolia is constructing the Tavan Tolgoi railway to increase coal imports to China. 
Tavan Togoi is estimated to have over 7 billion metric tons of proven deposits of coal and 
will provide 30 million metric tons of coal each year.306 Additionally, a Russian company 
is constructing the railway and should be completed by 2021. The railway will feed off a 
Russian rail system to the west to the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine and then south to connect to 
China’s existing railways (see Figure 26).307 
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Figure 26. Mongolia Railway Infrastructure308 
Market forces directly impact Mongolian coal exports. Since Mongolia is a 
landlocked country, coal can only be delivered overland at a higher cost. In early 2020, 
seaborne coal reached all-time low prices.309 Mongolian coal has issues competing with 
coal imports from maritime trade routes. While China can import coal from Mongolia at a 
higher cost in case of war or conflict that would cause maritime sea routes to close, the 
daily use of Mongolian coal will all depend on how competitive Mongolia can make its 
coal prices. Additionally, China will have a cheap reliable source of coal when the Tavan 
Tolgoi railway is completed. The railway is likely to help Mongolia drive down the coal 
price to compete with seaborne coal sources. While coal is crucial to China’s industrial 
sector, oil imports are significant for energizing the transport sector. 
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C. FOREIGN SOURCES—OIL 
In 2019, China imported 507.2 million metric tons, produced 191 million metric 
tons but consumed 718 million metric tons of oil.310 Since 2009, China doubled its oil 
imports and doubled its imports from South and Central America, Russia, and the Middle 
East (see Figure 27).311 Out of all of China’s oil imports, 44% originated from the Middle 
East, 17% from Saudi Arabia, and 10% from Iraq. While China relied on the Middle East 
for the majority of its imports, by percentage, the fastest growing suppliers of oil are the 
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil (see Figure 28).312 The losers in China’s oil 
import game were Iran and Venezuela because of increased pressure from U.S. sanctions. 
Between 2014–2019, the prevalent changes in China’s imports were that China decreased 
Iranian imports by 6%, Venezuela by 2%, and increased imports from Brazil by 6% and 
Russia by 4% (see Figures 29 and 30).313  
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Figure 27. China Oil Imports 2009 vs. 2019 in Million Metric Tons314 
 
Figure 28. 2018-2019 China changes in Oil Imports by Percentage315 
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Figure 29. 2019 China’s Oil Import by Country by Percentage316 
 
Figure 30. 2014 China’s Oil Import by Country by Percentage317 
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1. Saudi Arabia—Oil  
Saudi Arabia dominates China’s oil import market. Saudi Arabia is the largest 
exporter of oil in the world, and conversely, China imports more oil from Saudi Arabia 
than any other country. Saudi Arabia has participated in joint venture projects and 
agreements with China to project its downstream refining technical expertise to increase 
crude upstream demand. While Saudi Arabia owns 25% of Fujian Refining and 
Petrochemical Company Limited and 22.5% of Sinopec SenMei (Fujian) Petroleum 
Company Limited, it continues to implore in China’s oil industry.318 In 2016, Saudi Arabia 
acquired China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) as a customer for its sour 
crude oil, used in diesel and heavy oils.319 CNOOC upgraded its Huizhou facility in 
Guangdong province to receive Saudi sour crude and increase production from 240,000 
BPD to 440,000 BPD. An Aramco press release stated that “the MoU came in the context 
of intergovernmental efforts to further energy cooperation and forge closer synergies 
between Saudi Vision 2030 and China’s “Belt and Road” initiative.”320 The consistent 
commitments and investments in China are a priority for Saudi Arabian oil. While Saudi 
Arabia is a close ally of the United States, the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia 
is arguably pragmatic to support Saudi Arabia’s oil exports and China’s economy. If 
tensions between China and the United States were to intensify, it could affect China’s oil 
imports.  
2. Iran—Oil  
With the fourth-largest oil reserves in the world, geopolitical tensions prevent 
foreign investors, including China, from exporting Iranian oil.321 Between 2014–2019, oil 
imports from Iran to China decreased by 6%, likely from the absence of expected direct 
 
318 “Aramco Annual Report 2019,” Aramco, March 17, 2020, 163, https://www.aramco.com/-/media/
publications/corporate-reports/saudi-aramco-ara-2019-english.pdf. 
319 “CNOOC Receives First Cargo from Saudi Aramco,” Aramco, August 20, 2017, 
https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2017/cnooc-receives-first-cargo-from-saudi-aramco. 
320 Aramco. 
321 Benoit Faucon, “Iran’s Oil Boom Hasn’t Showed Up; Many International Companies Are Hesitant 
to Invest as the Trump Administration Threatens to Reimpose Sanctions - ProQuest,” March 7, 2018, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/2011279984?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
82 
investment in Iran’s oil industry and U.S. sanctions after withdrawing from the 2016 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).322 Following the 2016 JCPOA agreement, Iran 
expected an increase in foreign investment because of lifted pressure from western 
countries but accused the United States of spreading doubt and fear in foreign investors. 
Investors were worried if the United States vacated JCPOA and invoked sanctions on Iran, 
their companies and long-term investments would be affected.  
In an era of great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, 
China is pursuing a 25-year deal with Iran, which encompasses political, security, and 
economic benefits for both parties.323 The agreement appears to be more economical than 
military-related. While the deal contains joint military training, weapons development, and 
exercises, China would buy oil at a discounted rate over 25 years, adding to its diversified 
thirst for oil. The deal has yet to be approved by the CCP or the Iranian parliament.324 An 
agreement between China and Iran causes concern in Washington. While the United States 
is implementing a non-nuclear proliferation strategy against Iran, China views Iran as an 
opportunity for investment and natural resources. The deal arguably is on hold until the 
2020 U.S. Presidential Election, as the Democratic Party’s stance is “returning to mutual 
compliance” with JCPOA.325 
3. Russia—Oil  
China imports Russian oil from overland pipelines and through maritime shipping. 
The Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline transports 800,000 barrels of oil per 
day (BPD) to China.326 ESPO phase one has provided China with 600,000 BPD for the 
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last decade. ESPO phase two became operational in late 2019, increasing oil imports by 
200,000 BPD.327 ESPO phase 2 connects Daqing Oil Field to the ESPO phase 1 
pipeline.328 In 2013, China and Russia signed an oil deal worth $270 billion that spans 25 
years and increases Russian imports from 30 million metric tons to 50 million metric tons 
per year.329 What cannot be delivered through pipelines is provided by sea from Kozmino 
Port near Vladivostok and transported through the Tsushima Strait between South Korea 
and Japan. A long-term diverse oil agreement will increase Russian oil imports to China 
and decrease China’s risk of being affected by U.S. sanctions, the Strait of Hormuz 
situation, and the Malacca dilemma. Because of increased Sino-Russian relations, Russia 
will likely overtake Saudi Arabia as China’s lead importer of oil. 
4. Brazil—Oil  
Brazil has overtaken Venezuela as the number one oil exporter to China in South 
America because of China’s amenability with U.S. sanctions on Venezuela. Since 2014, 
China has increased Brazilian oil imports from 2% to 8% of total imports. Chinese National 
Oil Companies (NOC) are heavily invested in Brazilian energy infrastructure. Since 2007, 
China has loaned Brazil $28.9 billion.330 Of that $28.9 billion, $26.1 billion is in Brazil’s 
energy sector.331 In 2016, Petrobras, a Brazilian state-owned oil firm, borrowed $10 billion 
from China Development Bank, and in exchange for the loan, Chinese NOCs had 
preferential terms to 100,000 barrels of oil per day.332 However, in attempts to privatize 
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Petrobras, Brazil quickly repaid its debt to China to end its oil obligation.333 While 
Brazilian oil exports to China have increased over the past five years, since the loans are 
repaid, it is likely to decrease back to pre-2014 levels. The price of Brazilian oil will 
increase for China because they no longer have privileged prices. While China could 
continue to import oil from Brazil, the price change will likely cause Chinese companies 
to import cheaper oil from other countries.  
5. Venezuela—Oil 
Between 2014–2019, Venezuelan oil exports to China decreased by 2%, which 
could derive from China’s cooperation with U.S. sanctions against Venezuela. As part of 
China’s “oil for loan” strategy, China loaned Venezuela $50 billion in exchange for crude 
oil shipments.334 In August 2019, the United States increased sanctions on Venezuela and 
cautioned foreign companies from conducting business with Venezuelan oil companies.335 
In late 2019, Chinese NOCs suddenly stopped all oil shipments from Venezuela, 
illustrating compliance with U.S. sanctions. However, oil was indirectly shipped from 
Venezuela to China through a Russian third-party company Rosneft. Rosneft received 
Venezuelan oil via ship-to-ship transfers at sea and relabeled it as Malaysian oil. Peter 
Harrel from the Center for a New American Security claims that this falls into a ‘gray zone’ 
tactic used by China to continue to receive loan repayment through oil.336 While China is 
not dependent on Venezuelan oil, it seeks to gain compensation for its “oil for loan” 
strategy. Venezuelan oil might seem to be statistically decreasing, but oil continues to flow 
to China.  
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6. Angola—Oil  
While China’s oil imports from Angola increased by 3% between 2014–2019, 
Angola’s oil fields are rapidly declining in production. Belarmino Chitangueleca, an 
executive board member for Angola’s regulator for oil, natural gas, and biofuels, asserted 
that Angola’s oilfields are, on average, declining 10–15% per year.337 Angola is part of 
China’s “oil for loans” program. Angola owes China $20 billion in loans that were used to 
improve infrastructure, highways, and schools in Angola and to be repaid with oil.338 Some 
analysts claim that Angola might not repay its debt with oil, and China will pursue other 
means to secure its payment.339 While oil imports from Angola will arguably decrease in 
the long-term, China will need to secure compensation for its debt and explore other 
avenues for oil. 
D. FOREIGN SOURCES—LNG 
China became a net importer of natural gas in 2007.340 By 2024, analysts suggest 
that China will overtake Japan as the world’s largest importer of LNG.341 In 2019, China’s 
imported 84.8 billion cubic meters (BCM) of LNG from at least 21 different countries (see 
Figure 31).342 However, out of those 21 countries, four countries, Australia, Qatar, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia, accounted for 79% of all LNG imports (see Figure 32). China 
imported 39.8 BCM from Australia, 11.4 BCM from Qatar, 10 BCM of LNG from 
Malaysia, and 6.2 BCM from Indonesia.343 Since 2009, China has increased LNG imports 
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tenfold from 8 BCM to 84.8 BCM.344 Australia is China’s most importing trading partner 
for LNG because Australia alone accounted for 47% of LNG imports in 2019. Australia 
gained the leader of China’s LNG market from Qatar in 2015.345 Since then, Australia’s 
market share has increased from 28% to 47%, while Qatar’s has decreased from 25% to 
13%. Diversification of natural gas imports is vital for China’s energy mix. In 2009, China 
imported LNG from 11 countries, and meanwhile, in 2019, China more than doubled its 
LNG importers to 23. 
 
Figure 31. China LNG Imports 2009–2019 in BCM346 
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Figure 32. China Primary LNG Imports 2009–2019 in BCM347 
1. Australia—LNG 
China is dependent on Australian LNG, but tensions and an oversupplied market 
could change future trends and reliance on Australian LNG. China could move from long-
term to short-term contracts for LNG to free itself from commitments when geopolitical 
tensions are high and lower costs are available in the market.348 The natural gas market is 
oversupplied, which has caused prices to decrease.349 Numerous analysts argue that the 
oversupply in the LNG market is caused by an increase in production and not from the 
2019 coronavirus pandemic.350 Short-term contracts would allow China’s LNG importers 
to purchase LNG at a much lower price and reduce energy costs.  
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While immediate LNG imports will likely be unaffected by the Sino-Aussie trade 
war, Chinese companies will reevaluate their long-term LNG imports when current long-
term contracts expire. A senior energy scholar from Xiamen University claims that “the 
current tense relationship between China and Australia could potentially be a big obstacle 
for Chinese companies to sign up LNG long-term purchase contracts from the new 
proposed projects around in Australia.”351 China’s natural gas demand is expected to 
increase by 12% for the next three years.352 The CCP will likely attempt to wean its 
economy off of Australian LNG and further diversify LNG worldwide, but reducing 
dependence on Australian LNG is unlikely. Domestic production of natural gas is not 
capable of maintaining pace with the demand, which is why LNG exports from Australia 
are likely to remain the same or increase. China could lean on Qatar, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia for increased LNG imports while Sino-Aussie tensions are high.  
2. Qatar—LNG 
Qatar holds the second-largest LNG market share in China. China and Qatar have 
cooperated mostly, if not all, through LNG trade. Between 2009–2019, China increased 
Qatari LNG from 0.55 BCM to 11.4 BCM.353 Both China and Qatar relish the comparative 
advantages of each country. While Australia dominates the Chinese LNG market, China 
continues to sign long-term contracts for Qatari LNG. In 2008, China and Qatar signed a 
25-year LNG that would supply China with 3 million metric tons per year.354 Since then, 
Qatar has invested in LNG terminals in China. In 2015, Chinese and Qatari state-owned 
companies invested $5 billion to build an LNG terminal that processes 3 million metric 
tons per year.355  
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While Qatar expands its natural gas exploration, China is building ships for Qatari 
LNG transport. In 2020, Qatar Petroleum signed a deal with China State Shipbuilding 
Corporation for 60 LNG ships.356 At least 16 are capable of transporting 176,000 cubic 
meters of LNG each. The agreement puts Hudong’s LNG ship construction near capacity 
out to 2027. Qatar is expanding its natural gas exploration as part of phase two of the North 
Field development project, which will increase Qatari LNG output to 126 million tons per 
year. Saad Sherida Al-Kabi, Chief Executive of Qatar Petroleum, stated that this deal puts 
Qatar Petroleum on “the right track to ensuring that the company’s future fleet 
requirements will be met in due time to support its increasing LNG production 
capacity.”357  
3. Malaysia—LNG  
Malaysia ranks third in LNG imports into China and is the third-largest exporter of 
LNG in the world.358 In 2019, Malaysia held 12% of China’s LNG market.359 Malaysia 
is in a strategic geographic position surrounded by the Malacca Strait and the South China 
Sea. Malaysia’s geographical position reduces transportation costs for Malaysian LNG 
tankers destined for China, compared to Qatar or Australia. In 2006, a subsidiary of 
Petronas, Malaysia LNG, signed the first LNG deal with China’s Shanghai LNG 
Company.360 The agreement supplies China with 3.03 million metric tons of LNG 
annually for 25 years. In 2020, a 12-year deal was signed between Petronas and Shenergy 
in China and will increase Malaysian LNG imports to China by 1.5 million metric tons per 
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year.361 The agreement also encompasses a contract between the two countries for 
constructing and chartering LNG tankers.  
Malaysia plans to import LNG access to remote areas of China. In May 2020, 
Petronas signed a deal with China’s Tiger Clean Energy Limited to import LNG tanks to 
be transported to remote regions of China.362 Petronas Vice President Ahmad Adly Alias 
stated that “through this modern approach in delivering LNG, we established a virtual 
pipeline that effectively enables LNG to reach off-grid customers who are not directly 
served by the natural gas distribution system in China.”363 While these tanks will increase 
LNG imports slightly, they will provide a stopgap measure while China improves its 
pipeline infrastructure to support remote areas of China. Malaysia and China have 
cooperated financially through LNG deals. Without regard to long-standing issues in the 
South China Sea, relations between the two countries appear to be in good standing. 
4. Indonesia—LNG 
Indonesia is the fourth largest importer of LNG to China. In 2019, Indonesia 
imported 6.2 BCM of LNG to China, increasing from 0.72 BCM in 2009 but decreased 
from 6.7 BCM in 2019.364 While Indonesia only held a 7% market share of China’s LNG 
imports, it provides China with further diversification of imports.365 Indonesia’s proven 
LNG reserves are 103.4 trillion cubic feet and are geographically positioned to provide 
cheap LNG to China.366 In 2002, CNOOC signed a contract with Indonesia’s Tangguh 
LNG development to provide China with 2.6 million metric tons of natural gas per year for 
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25 years, which started in 2007 and 12.5% ownership.367 Since then, Indonesia has 
provided China with 40.67 BCM of LNG.368 PGN signed a deal with Sinopec in June 
2020.369 However, Indonesia is seeking new deals with China, specifically Sinopec, to 
secure long-term contracts that expire in 2021.370 While contracts are set to expire, China 
will likely stray away from long-term LNG contracts because of the recent oversupplied 
market. Spot and medium-term agreements are likely to be signed with Indonesia to secure 
cheap LNG to support China’s resource diversification. 
E. FOREIGN SOURCES—PIPELINE NATURAL GAS 
Natural gas pipelines are significant to fill China’s natural gas demands and reduce 
risk to the Malacca dilemma. In 2019, from natural gas pipelines, China imported 47.7 
BCM of natural gas from five countries: 31.6 BCM from Turkmenistan, 6.5 BCM from 
Kazakhstan, 4.9 from Uzbekistan, 4.4 BCM from Myanmar, and 0.3 BCM from Russia 
(see Figure 33).371 In 2019, China had three operational natural gas pipelines with an 
operating capacity of 105 BCM of natural gas per year.372 Additionally, two additional 
pipelines are planned: Line D that is part of the Central Asia-China Pipeline and the Power 
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of Siberia-2 (see Figure 34).373 Between 2009–2019, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan provided China with 277.45 BCM of natural gas.374 Turkmenistan has led 
pipeline imports and has imported 242.75 BCM of natural gas to China. Kazakhstan began 
importing natural gas through the pipeline in 2013 and has imported 14.3 BCM of natural 
gas to China, while Uzbekistan started importing in 2016 and has provided 20.4 BCM. 
Since 2015, the natural gas pipeline from Myanmar has provided 21.4 BCM to China.375 
Russian Power of Siberia-1 pipeline became operational in December 2019 and imported 
0.3 BCM of natural gas.376  
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Figure 33. China Pipeline Imports 2009–2019 in BCM377 
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Figure 34. CACGP Current and Projected Pipelines378 
1. Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline 
The CACGP became operational on December 14h, 2009.379 Since the launch of 
the pipeline, it has provided China with 280.55 BCM of natural gas.380 The pipeline, 
known as Line A, was the first pipeline to transport natural gas into China and began 
production in 2010. Line B became operational in 2010, lifting the capacity to 30 BCM per 
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year. However, 30 BCM per year was not reached until 2015.381 In 2014, Line C, which 
was constructed parallel to Line A and B, became operational, which increased the Central 
Asia-China Pipeline capacity to 55 BCM of natural gas per year.382 All three pipelines 
travel from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and end in China and connect to 
China’s West-East pipeline that transports natural gas from Xianjing province to China’s 
southeastern region. 
China’s BRI and thirst for natural gas has led to the possible expansion of CACGP. 
The addition of Line D would provide an additional 30 BCM of natural gas, increasing 
CACGP capacity to 85 BCM per year.383 The project has struggled to progress because of 
multiple delays between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China; however, tunnels and the 
pipeline are under construction. Line D is the only pipeline part of CACGP that will provide 
natural gas from only Turkmenistan and is estimated to be complete by 2022.384 
2. Turkmenistan 
Chinese and Turkmenistan relations are deeply rooted in energy and China’s BRI. 
Turkmen and Chinese bilateral ties are increasing through the alignment of BRI and 
increased cooperation with tourism, technology, and economic trade integration.385 The 
current pipeline gas deal began in 2009 for Turkmenistan to import 30 BCM of natural gas 
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to China for 30 years.386 Since the inception of the pipeline, Turkmenistan has exported 
more natural gas through pipelines than the leading LNG importer Australia. Between 
2010–2019, Turkmenistan imported 242 BCM, while Australia imported 148 BCM of 
natural gas.387 Turkmen’s gas supply is a vital artery for China’s natural gas consumption 
and fueled its economic growth. 
3. Kazakhstan 
Tensions are high between Kazakhstan and China because of Chinese oppression 
and assimilation of Uyghurs in Xianjing province, but that has not affected the natural gas 
trade. In 2013, although in small amounts, 0.1 BCM, Kazakhstan began exporting natural 
gas via the CACGP.388 China and Kazakhstan signed a five-year deal in 2018 for exports 
to increase exports twice the amount of natural gas up to 10 BCM per year.389 Exports in 
2018 reached 5.4 BCM and increased to 6.5 BCM in 2019.390 Chinese oppression in 
Xianjing concerns Kazakh citizens about China’s involvement in Kazakhstan.391 Native 
Kazakhs are affected by Chinese policies in Xianjing province; however, the Kazakh 
government has yet to condemn Chinese policies and instead is requesting the release of 
Kazakh citizens and those who were seeking citizenship.392 Chinese investment in 
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Kazakhstan will likely refrain the Kazakh government from criticizing Chinese policies in 
Xianjing, and Kazakh natural gas will continue to contribute to China’s energy security 
portfolio.  
4. Russia—Pipeline Natural Gas  
Natural gas pipelines increase relations between a torn Russian economy and 
prosperous China. The first Russian natural gas pipeline became operational in December 
2019.393 The 30-year deal between China and Russia will boost China’s natural gas 
imports by 38 BCM. The Power of Siberia-1 pipeline marks a significant milestone for 
Sino-Russian relations. In an era of great power competition, Russia and China have 
ambitions to create a substitute for the U.S.-led world order.394 China and Russia are 
feeding off of one another’s comparative advantages. While Russia views China as a 
cornerstone for securing revenue, China is fortifying its natural gas portfolio.  
Russia and China are planning on constructing another pipeline to strengthen ties, 
revenue, and energy security. The Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, although not contracted yet, 
could increase China’s pipeline natural gas by 50 BCM per year.395 The proposed pipeline 
will travel from Russia, Mongolia, and into the Inner Mongolia province of China (see 
Figure 35). Analysts estimate that the deal will take a similar timeline as Power of Siberia-
1 and forecast the Power of Siberia-2 will become operational around 2030.396 
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Figure 35. Russian Power of Siberia Pipelines397 
5. Myanmar  
The Myanmar-China natural gas pipeline is an additional prong in China’s 
multifaceted approach for diversifying natural gas pipeline imports. In 2013, the pipeline 
began production with the capacity of 12 BCM per year. However, the maximum that the 
pipeline has imported is 4.4 BCM in 2019.398 The pipeline connects China’s southwestern 
region with a cleaner and more reliable alternative to coal. Additionally, the pipeline 
connects China with the Bay of Bengal. China could use the gas terminal to import 
seaborne LNG through the pipeline to avoid the Malacca dilemma (see Figure 36).399 
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While the pipeline is not operating at full capacity, China could also divert its Middle East 
imports to the terminal to reduce transportation costs.  
 
Figure 36. China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline400 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes that one major driver for China’s foreign energy security 
policies is geopolitical tensions. China has been indirectly affected by U.S. sanctions on 
Iran and Venezuela. While China has attempted to illegally acquire resources by importing 
Iranian and Venezuelan oil under different state flags; however, China cannot legitimately 
rely on illegal imports for long periods of time. Because of U.S. influence on China’s 
energy sources, China’s thirst for oil, and increased Sino-Russian relations, China will 
likely transition some of its oil and natural gas imports from seaborne imports to Russian 
pipeline imports. The pipelines provide an alternative conduit to seaborne imports and less 
risk to the Malacca dilemma. China could avoid flashpoints between the U.S. and Iran if 
 
400 Source: DeepResource. 
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Iran decides to close the Strait of Hormuz and also avoid the Malacca Strait. Additionally, 
it provides China with another source of energy to rely on if the U.S. pressures countries 
that import energy to China. Lastly, Sino-Aussie energy relations are affected by the 
current trade dispute, which has caused a partial unofficial ban on coal exports from 
Australia 
Market forces is another driver for China’s energy security policy. China, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia compete within the South China Sea dispute but are cordial with 
energy relations. China seeks to take advantage of the oversupplied LNG market and is not 
renewing long-term contracts with Australia. Mongolia faces issues with competing with 
China’s seaborne imports because of transportation costs. However, when the Tavan Togoi 
railway is completed, Mongolia will be able to reduce transportation costs to reduce costs 
in hopes of increasing coal imports to China.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
This chapter will review the aims of this thesis, a summary of its findings, and 
assess the future trends of China’s energy security policies. This thesis aimed to advance 
scholarship on the drivers of China’s energy security policies. It tested three hypotheses: 
diversification of resources due to foreign pressures, development of green energy, and an 
increase in economic growth and urbanization, all of which this study determined to be 
guiding China’s energy security policies. This study examined China’s energy 
consumption, production, and imports to determine how these different influenced China’s 
energy security policies.  
Chapter I setup this study by outlining its significance of research, literature review, 
and defined hypotheses. Chapter II examined the motivations for China’s domestic energy 
security policies and reviewed China’s energy consumption by source—industrial, 
residential, transport—and its domestic energy portfolio—coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear—
and complications within each source of energy. Then Chapter III reviewed the drivers of 
China’s green energy policies and broadly examined the resources of the renewable energy 
sector. Lastly, Chapter IV reviewed the drivers of China’s foreign energy security policies, 
specifically reviewed energy imports—coal, oil, natural gas—and analyzed geopolitical 
issues between China and export countries. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
One driver of China’s energy security policy is a significant increase in growth, 
consumption, and urbanization. The largest population in the world resides in China, and 
its population is transitioning from rural areas to urban population centers. The increase in 
growth and consumption translates to energy usage. China is the largest consumer of 
energy in the world. The largest consumer of energy in China is the industrial sector, and 
the second is the residential sector, which both primarily consume coal. China, however, 
in an effort to decrease carbon emissions, is slowly replacing coal with natural gas. 
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Additionally, because of the increase in urbanization, oil consumption also grew by 52% 
between 2010–2017 due to the increase in automobile usage.401  
While China’s population rate of increase is declining and is expected to be 
negative by 2035, mass urbanization is occurring, which will surge electricity consumption 
in urban population centers. Urbanization is assessed to grow from 2018 values of 59.58% 
to 70% by 2035.402 Urbanization also intensifies the number of automobiles on the roads 
in China. Because of urbanization, oil consumption is expected to rise. The increase in 
growth and urbanization has led to transportation bottlenecks in the coal sector. While the 
major population centers in China are located in southeast China and along the coast, its 
domestic energy resources are located in the northern and northwestern provinces. In the 
oil sector, consumption continues to grow while production remains stagnant because of 
the depletion of oil reserves. Natural gas production, however, is growing slightly but 
cannot keep pace with consumption because it lacks the technology to extract deep shale 
gas, which is why China continues to rely on coal as a primary source of energy. Coal, 
however, is a major pollutant and causes domestic concerns for China’s population.  
Air pollution, climate change, and major health issues have also caused China to 
pursue green energy policies. China is the number one greenhouse gas polluter in the world. 
Air pollution has increased significantly in China because of its sustained period of 
economic growth. Air pollution and climate change have caused major health issues, which 
has led to mass protests from the Chinese people and world leaders.403 The CCP has 
increased its awareness of this issue. President Xi Jinping stated that China will “peak CO2 
emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.”404 The CCP utilizes its Five-
Year Plan to deliver its goals to local officials for the renewable energy sector, which has 
led to heavy investment in the renewable energy sector. Renewable energy in China is 45% 
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of the world’s investment in the sector.405 China’s investment has led to the creation of 
companies that have become worldwide leaders in hydropower, wind, solar, and battery 
technology.  
While China is the world leader in renewable energy, it has experienced issues that 
are inherent to the CCP. China’s five-year targets restrain laissez-faire market principles. 
Because of government intervention, the renewable energy sector experienced boom and 
bust cycles, which has contributed to curtailment. The CCP, however, has attempted to 
alleviate its contribution to curtailment by eliminating feed-in tariffs on January 1, 2021, 
which current data does not reflect the effects of this. The elimination of feed-in tariffs will 
likely increase market participation, research and development, and the reduction in prices. 
The CCP emphasizes new renewable energy construction but allows local officials to build 
coal plants when the capacity cannot be met by renewables. Additionally, while some 
provincial electric grids are integrated, China lacks the infrastructure to connect all 
provinces to an integrated electricity grid. An integrated electric grid, less government 
intervention, and less expensive renewable energy could factor into whether a local official 
decides to build a new coal plant, solar or wind farms, or purchase excess energy from 
neighboring provinces. While China is a major coal producer and is innovating green 
energy, it cannot keep pace with the current energy demand and has to imports foreign 
sources.  
This thesis finds that China is forced to diversify its energy portfolio due to a myriad 
of both domestic and international challenges: inability to self-sustain from domestic 
resources, geopolitical tensions, lack of control over strategic chokepoints, and the 
unpredictability of the energy market. While China is abundant in coal, it lacks sufficient 
domestic oil and natural gas to meet its demand. China cannot maintain sufficient oil 
production to meet domestic usage. China’s oil production capacity remained stagnant 
from 2009–2019; however, its consumption has increased by 67.3%.406 If China’s oil 
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consumption were to remain the same, it would only have enough oil to last 18.7 years.407 
China has the most untapped shale gas in the world, but its technology is still at the 
elementary stage because shale gas is found deeper in the ground than in the United 
States.408 
Geopolitical tensions, exemplified by U.S. sanctions, have directly and negatively 
impacted China’s energy portfolio, while a Sino-Aussie trade war arguably has produced 
a minor impact. China’s compliance with U.S. sanctions after the United States withdrew 
from the JCPOA has resulted in a decrease in oil imports from Iran.409 In 2019, the United 
States placed sanctions on Venezuela, and, again, in response, China ceased importing 
Venezuelan oil.410 While China’s compliance with U.S. sanctions appears legitimate, 
China has illegally imported oil from Iran and Venezuela but cannot rely on illegal imports 
for a sustained period of time. Australia and China are currently in a trade war, but tariffs 
have only been placed on produce and wine, and the energy sector has yet to be impacted 
by the trade dispute. China placed an unofficial ban on Australian coal, but some analysts 
argued that the ban was placed to protect China’s domestic coal industry.411 In order for 
China to diversify its energy portfolio, it has sought to secure access to resources abroad 
but has faced significant challenges. The Malacca dilemma and the insecurity of the Strait 
of Hormuz have driven China to secure viable access to energy resources. The U.S. Navy 
primarily controls the Malacca Strait, and over 80% of China’s oil and 11% of its LNG 
imports travel through the Malacca Strait.412 In the event that the Malacca Strait was ever 
blockaded, it would disrupt all shipping, which would significantly China’s access to its 
energy imports. The Strait of Hormuz is another chokepoint that causes concern for China. 
China is heavily reliant on the Middle East for oil. Out of all of China’s imports, 48% of 
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its oil and 10% of its natural gas derived from the Middle East.413 China has responded by 
an increased naval presence in the Middle East to protect its seaborne trade.414 China has 
also secured access to Russian oil and natural gas via pipelines. In 2013, China and Russian 
signed a 25-year oil deal, and in 2019, they signed a 30-year natural gas deal that provides 
secure access to oil and natural gas.415 China has also incorporated the Central Asia-China 
Gas Pipeline to avoid the Malacca dilemma and security issues with the Strait of Hormuz.  
The energy marketplace has affected the diversification of China’s energy mix. 
China imports coal primarily from Indonesia, Australia, and Mongolia. While China has 
the largest amount of coal deposits in the world, it is sometimes cheaper to import coal to 
its urban population centers from Indonesia and Australia and to preserve its domestic 
resources. While the completion of the Tavan Togoi railway will provide China with secure 
and inexpensive access to Mongolia’s coal resources, Mongolia is not yet able to compete 
with seaborne coal prices.416 China is dependent on Australian LNG. When China’s long-
term contracts with Australia expire and with the current Sino-Aussie trade war, Australia 
is likely to pursue short-term contracts to diversify its LNG market with less expensive 
providers.417 Market forces are significant in this scenario because China does not want to 
commit to long-term contracts with Australia, while LNG prices are low in an oversupplied 
market. While reducing its dependence entirely on Australia is unlikely, China could 
diversify its LNG market for Qatari, Malaysian, or Indonesian exports.  
B. FUTURE TRENDS 
China is coal-dependent, and this trend will continue because China does not have 
an alternate source of energy to replace coal. Coal will continue to be the dominant source 
of energy in China. China does not have a sufficient amount of natural gas or renewable 
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energy to replace the pollutant energy to meet social demands. The main issue with coal is 
that it is not environmentally friendly and that China’s coal distribution is located in the 
north and northwestern parts of China, which has caused energy blackouts in the past. 
China has somewhat alleviated the bottleneck issue with transportation by building the 
Hajoi railway, but as urbanization increases, so will energy demand. While China 
emphasizes renewable energy, it continues to build coal plants. China’s coal technology, 
however, is cutting edge and is more efficient and less pollutant than its former 
technology.418 The transition from subcritical to ultra-supercritical coal plants will 
contribute to a decrease in pollution. Coal will likely continue to be a primary source of 
energy until China is able to replace coal plants with natural gas, renewable energy, or 
nuclear power if China reverses its negative stance caused by the 2011 Fukushima incident. 
China will continue to secure overland access to both foreign oil and natural gas so 
that it can fulfill its energy demands. China will also continue to diversify its seaborne 
energy imports to reduce its reliance on any one country to reduce the potential impacts of 
geopolitical tensions. Pipelines significantly reduce China’s risk to the Malacca dilemma 
and uncertainty of the Strait of Hormuz. China will likely continue to seek pipelines from 
west Asia and Russia to secure access to resources that are not impacted by the United 
States Navy.  
As the leader in renewable energy, China will continue to innovate and eventually 
replace some of its coal plants to reduce carbon emissions and reduce the negative effects 
of climate change. The transition from hydrocarbons to renewables will cause several 
challenges, such as market reform, energy distribution, and curtailment. However, the CCP 
generally supports decreasing air pollution throughout the country because of its domestic 
concerns about the negative impacts of air pollution. China is the leader in all sectors of 
renewable energy—hydroelectricity, solar, wind—and will continue to innovate the sector. 
China’s heavy pursuance of renewable energy, combined with the U.S. withdrawal from 
the Paris Climate Agreement, provide China with an opportunity to lead the world in green 
energy development amid growing great power competition.  
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